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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies three topics in modern Chinese economic development. The prob-
lems tackled include the determinants of city size distribution and economy growth, the impact
of privatization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the relationship between executive
compensation and rm-level risk.
Chapter 1 documents the emergence of Zipfs law in China, using a new database containing
population and other information for Chinese cities in 34 years during 1918-2008. I show that
during much of the Revolutionary(i.e. Maoist) period, there were systematic deviations from
Zipfs law; in particular, small cities grew more rapidly than large cities due to restrictions on
internal migration. However, since Deng Xiaopings famous economic reforms, migration has
been less restrictive, and the city-size distribution in China has rapidly converged to Zipfs
law, similar to the pattern observed in developed, capitalisteconomies.
Chapter 2 studies a key feature of economic development in China today, namely, the
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). My analysis uses a rm-level panel data
set derived from primary sources, which is a signicant improvement over previous studies.
Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence, event-studystyle analysis, I show that privatization leads to
substantial downsizing of employment, increasing labor productivity, and rising protability.
Chapter 3 studies the relationships among rm size, select features of executive compensa-
tion (cash and stock-holding) and risk-taking, using a new database of 197 nancial institutions
v
in China, focusing in particular on the behavior of executives during the recent global nancial
crisis. The empirical results show that stock holding correlates with a reduction in risk-taking
during the crisis but cash compensation evidently did not adjust in this manner. I nd no
evidence of a change in risk associated with an expansion of rm size. Although based on
historical evidence, these results may be useful for risk management by nancial rms in
future crises.
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1Chapter 1
The Emergence of Zipfs Law in China, 1918-2008
1.1 Introduction
Zipfs (1949) law appears to be a universal regularity and is believed to hold in many elds
of natural science and social science, e.g. physics, biology, geography, economics, sociology
and linguistics. It basically says that the rank-size relationship is linear in the logarithms.
This rank-size rule has been widely applied in urban economics, and shown to be applicable
to both contemporary and historical data within many countries. That is, the distribution of
city population within a country follows a power law with the exponential parameter equal to
1. For instance, Mills and Hamilton (1994) use urban population data of the United States
for 1990 and their results favor Zipfs law; Guerin-Pace (1995) shows that Zipfs law holds for
French data for 1831-1982; Terra (2009) examines empirically the validity of Zipfs law for a
sample of 115 countries covering the period 1970-2009 and nds that it is not rejected in 62
of them. Substantive attempts have been made to provide a theoretical basis of Zipfs law
in economics, but most of the arguments seem to be controversial (see e.g. Krugman, 1995;
Gabaix, 1999; Gan et al., 2006; Fujita et al., 1999; Cordoba, 2008; Rossi-Hansber and Wright,
2007).
This paper addresses the validity of Zipfs Law for a country currently undergoing tremen-
dous structural change and a tumultuous political history during the twentieth century China.
As I discuss later in the paper, there are good reasons to suspect that Chinas urban structure
might have deviated from Zipfs Law various points in Chinas historical development over the
past century, but equally good reasons to hypothesize that the urban distribution more recent
is converging to the pattern implied by Zipfs Law.
2Despite its obvious importance in todays global economy and its (very) long economic
history, there have been few papers to study to the size distribution of Chinas urban areas. A
truly long-run study encompassing several centuries is next to impossible due to the absence
of accurate historical population data. Therefore, most of the previous studies on this issue
use data covering only a few specic years. For example, Song and Zhang (2002) examine
the city size distribution and urban growth in China using city-level data for 1991 and 1998.
Perhaps the closest to this paper is Anderson and Ge (2005), who construct a sample of cities
for eight years during the period 1949-1999 to analyze variation in urban growth as well as
the city size distribution. My paper extends this previous work to cover 34 years during the
period from 1918 to 2008, including pre-1949 data as well as detailed information for the Mao
and Post-Mao eras. This database provides a great opportunity to examine important turning
points in Chinese urban development history characterized by tremendous changes and rapid
evolution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the economics of Zipfs Law, while
section III provides some background to urbanization and the evolution of city system in China.
The data utilized in this paper are discussed in Section IV. Section V presents a framework
to examine the validity of Zipfs law, while section VI provides estimates of above framework
and interprets the empirical results in the Chinese case. Concluding remarks are presented in
section VII.
1.2 Zipfs Law in City Size Distribution
Consider a set of cities which are ranked in descending order (that is, the largest city is given
a rank of 1, the second a rank of 2, and so on), Zipfs law states that a regression of the
logarithm of the rank on the corresponding logarithm of size yields a slope coe¢ cient equal to
one.
Algebraically, the distribution of city population follows a power law such that
Pr (S > N) = N 
3where S is the population size of a city, and N denotes some threshold.
Therefore, the relationship between city rank, denoted by R, and its population has the
following form
lnR = ln   lnS
Adding an error term produces the following regression model
logRi =    logSi + "i, i = 1; : : : ; n
where i is the city index and "i is an i.i.d. process. If the estimate of the shape parameter
 is statistically indistinguishable from one, I conclude that Zipfs law is applicable for the
data.
The use of regression to test Zipfs Law is not without drawbacks. In particular, if the
sample size is small, OLS may underestimate the shape parameter, and the standard errors
will also be too small (see e.g. Gabaix and Ioannides, 2004).
The theoretical basis of Zipfs law invokes proportional random growth with small frictions
in population size (see Gabiax, 2008). An informal derivation is shown as follows.
Suppose that the normalized population of city i follows the process
Si;t+1 = i;t+1Si;t
where i;t+1 is the growth rate, an i.i.d. random variable. For some threshold N , I dene
Gt (N) = P (Si;t > N). Therefore,
Gi;t+1 (N) = P (Si;t+1 > N) = P

Si;t >
N
i;t+1

= E

Gt

N
i;t+1

=
Z 1
0
Gt

N


f () d
If there exists a steady state distribution, then I have
GS (N) =
Z 1
0
GS

N


f () d
Assume that the steady state distribution follows a Pareto law, then I can rewrite above
4equation as
GS (N) = N  =
Z 1
0


N

 
f () d = N 
Z 1
0
f () d
which yields E



= 1. That is, the proportional random growth could lead to a Pareto
law distribution with  equal to the solution to E



= 1. In order to guarantee that there
is a steady state distribution, I need some deviations from the pure random growth process to
prevent cities from being too small. Otherwise, the distribution will become lognormal without
a steady state (see Gibrat, 1931). If I compress the deviations to make the random growth
process hold throughout most of the distribution, the mean normalized population size will be
S = E [St] = E [St+1] =    . In this case, S = E [St] = E []E [St+1] = E []S. Therefore,
E[] = 1, implying that Zipfs law holds.
1.3 Urbanization and City System in China
1.3.1 Urban development before 1949
China has a long history of urban development, which can be dated back to the Shang Dy-
nasty (1766-1122 B.C.). Traditional Chinese cities were primarily constructed for political
and administrative purposes, with sizes and locations mainly determined according to their
importance and roles in the administrative or military hierarchy (see Ma, 1971; Skinner, 1977;
Huang, 2006). For thousands of years, the di¤erence between cities and rural areas was not
as signicant as it is today and large-scale internal migration was rarely seen. Chinese cities
started to enhance their commercial function in the late Song Dynasty (960-1279), and were
generally characterized by commerce only until the Ching Dynasty (1644-1912). For most of
imperial Chinas history, urban population lived on the goods they produced, e.g. vegetables,
eggs, and cloth, and exchange and trade only happened when necessary. Without great nat-
ural disasters or military conicts, people tended to stay in the places where they were born,
because of high transportation costs, being heavily dependent on the agricultural goods they
produced, tradition of adhering to their native lands, and other facts. The prolonged existence
of capitation tax (B.C.203-A.D.1716) also discouraged the rural-urban migration, because it
5was required to be paid mainly according to the number of people registered in a household,
no matter whether some of the family members had moved to other places.
As the last dynasty of China, the Ching Dynasty exhibited many di¤erent characteristics in
urban development from its predecessors. After being defeated by the Great Britain in the First
Opium War (1839-1842), China had to open many coastal and river cities as Treaty Ports (e.g.
Nanjing, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Guangzhou were opened to the Great Britain as Treaty Ports
in 1842; above ports and 11 new ones were opened to France, the Great Britain, Russia, and
the US in 1858; another 4 new ports were opened to Japan in 1895). The unfair foreign trade,
on one hand, largely exploited local resources in favor of the invaders, but on the other hand,
induced unprecedented growth of commercial activities and population in the Treaty Ports.
After Tsarist Russia and Japan occupied the Northeast of China to extract mineral resources,
large industrial cities started to appear in the occupied region. Railroads and bridges, built
by the invaders to transport natural resources and military supplies, indirectly reduced the
transportation costs for migration. The Treaty Ports and the Northeast became more peaceful
and prosperous than other regions, because they were more clearly carved up by the occupying
powers and fewer military conicts occurred. As a result, there was a massive migration to
the Treaty Ports and the Northeast, and new cities grew up there.
During the period 1912-1949, China was known as the Republic of China, actually torn
by the separatist warlord regimes and plunged into civil wars (1927-1937, 1946-1949). The
Southern China, where was governed by the Kuomintang (KMT) instead of several territories,
are relatively peaceful and achieved rapid growth in economy and population. At the same
time, the Northeastern China su¤ered more from the wars against Japan (1937-1949). Hence,
migrations were mainly towards the South and cities in the Southern China grew relatively
rapidly. Overall, urban system tended to be more uneven due to widespread social problems
aggravated by the civil wars and the Japanese invasion (see Huang, 2006).
61.3.2 Urban development for 1949-2008
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in 1949, the urban system was on
the edge of collapsing and in need of thorough modication. Recovery from all the social prob-
lems was slow but steady, and population was increased gradually. City distribution tended
to be more resource-based, except for the periods when large-scale administrative migration
took place, e.g. the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the Send-Down Movement (1968).
Both economy growth and urban development have greatly beneted from Deng Xiaopings
economy reform (1978-1992). The ratio of urban population to total population dramatically
increased from 17.92% in 1978 to 27.63% in 1992 (see Zhang and Song, 2003), and achieved
45.68% in 2008.
Internal migration in China has been restricted, especially during the Mao Era. Due to
the limited food supply as well as the need of maintaining regional stability, Chinese govern-
ment used purchase permits to redistribute recourses and control migrations (1953-1993,
e.g. Liang Piao for rice/wheat purchase, Bu Piao for cloth purchase). Purchase permits must
be presented along with currency during checkout, and one could not purchase more than the
maximal amount of his purchase permits. Such purchase permits were assigned monthly to
each individual according to the household residence registration system. For the rural popu-
lation moving to cities without being registered as local residents, the eligibility of getting the
purchase permits was violated. After the rst stage of Deng Xiaopings economy reform (1978-
1989), usage of purchase permitswas gradually abolished and rural-urban migration became
prevalent. However, internal migration still is restricted, especially in those extremely large
cities, e.g. Shanghai and Beijing. Current restrictions on migration involve living permits,
house purchase limitation, labor market discrimination, and so on.
1.4 The Data
The data used in this paper are derived from di¤erent sources. The population data mainly
come from China: The Forty Years of Urban Development (State Statistical Bureau, 1990),
and China City Statistical Yearbook (State Statistical Bureau, various years). These are very
7comprehensive and consistent statistic works compiled by Urban Social and Economic Survey
Organization of the State Statistical Bureau in China, including multitudinous information
about population, education, transportation, economy growth, and so on, for the time period
1949-1988, and 1992-2008, respectively. I also apply information about average wage of sta¤
and workers in city for my analysis of city growth. The census data have been questioned
due to the varying denition of urban population (see e.g. Chan, 1994; Goldstein, 1990).
Most concerns are about the 1982 urban population data, which is believed to include both
non-agricultural and agricultural population in each city instead of only counting the non-
agricultural population as before (see Kirkby, 1985; Ran and Berry, 1989). To avoid possible
overcounting problem, I do not adopt population data from 1982 census and subsequent sta-
tistics in my analysis. Non-agricultural and agricultural population was reported separately
for 1992-2008, and the overcounting issue is less likely to exist.
I supplement above population database by the data in History of Chinas Population (Hou,
2001) to include information for 1918. Since the 1918 data were obtained by using sampling
survey and estimation with limited time and technology, there might be either overcount or
undercount problem in the data. Also, the criteria for city designation used in di¤erent data
sources might di¤er which could induce biased estimates. However, including the 1918 data can
throw some light on the trend of urban population in China for the Pre-Mao Era and provide
comparisons between population distributions under di¤erent historical backgrounds.1To make
the data more compatible, I check historic literature and geographical maps to match cities in
1918 and 1949. I take into account the mergers and splits of cities, if they are well documented.
For the vague boundary changes and region re-denomination, I drop the related cities in my
1Unfortunately, data for urban population between 1918 and 1949 were not well collected and maintained,
and most of the limited records were destroyed because of the change of dynasties and the sequential wars. It
is possible to obtain population data from the Di Fang Zhi maintained by local governments, but it would be
very costly and require a huge amount of work. Also, the Di Fang Zhis were usually created by county or
township, which means that composing city-level population data from them might be vain if data for one or
more counties or towns were missing. and most of the limited records were destroyed because of the change of
dynasties and the sequential wars. It is possible to obtain population data from the Di Fang Zhi maintained
by local governments, but it would be very time-consuming and require a huge amount of work. Also, the Di
Fang Zhis were usually created by county or township, which means that composing city-level population data
from them might be vain if data for one or more counties or towns were missing.
8database.
In order to chart the spread of railroads, I generate a consistent database by checking the
date of the rst railroad station established in each city. This information can be obtained from
the websites of the local governments and some forums regarding history or transportation.
I also use the available historic railroad timetables as a supplement, which is similar to the
travel guides except that they did not give route maps and new versions were only published
when there were changes in rail routes or schedules. The travel guides of the United States are
believed to be the best possible sources of rail information due to competition and frequent
publication (see Margo, 1988), which are di¤erent from the online archive and rail timetables I
used here. However, my rail data also have high reliability. China is a county which largely rely
on the local and central governments to collect and maintain both historic and contemporary
records, and the o¢ cial data sources of rails are considered to be the most complete and
accurate, regardless of market competition and publication frequency. Also, due to its large
population and high demand for rail transportation, China establishes at least one rail station
in every city with railroad(s) cross it, and the stations are usually located in the center of
the cities for the convenience of the residents. In this paper, I do not consider the case that
residents in one city might more easily take advantage of a railroad than the residents in the
nearby city when the railroad is on the boundary of them or in the borderland of the other
city, because it is rarely seen that a railroad is built on the boundary of two cities in China
or in the place with relatively low population density. These special characteristics of Chinas
railroad imply that rail station is a feasible indicator for having railroad(s) in the city.
Table 1.1 presents a summary of urbanization in China for period 1918-2008. The changes
in urban population growth rates coincide with the primary evolutions in Chinese economic
and population policies very well. The growth rates in urban population always exceed those
for total population, which partly shows that the city growth in China is mainly caused by
internal migration instead of natural population growth. The urban population share has been
increased since 1918, and reached 45.68% in 2008.
Finally, I drop the observations with population less than 30,000 and 50,000 for 1918 and
91949-2008, respectively. I claim that constructing a database in this way is necessary to capture
the true pattern of city distribution, because the original sample contains a great amount of
extreme small cities which might cause the violation of Zipfs law (see Gabaix and Ioannides,
2004). A summary statistics of the complete sample and the balanced panel is provided in
Table 1.2.
1.5 Empirical Methodology
1.5.1 Framework and strategy
In this paper, I provide estimates for the shape parameter, , using OLS, and quantile regres-
sions. The classical OLS regression presents a general relationship between city ranks and the
corresponding population sizes in China during 1918-2007 to examine whether and when the
Zipfs law emerged. I also control for the e¤ect of water transportation and railroads in the
second OLS model as a robustness check. For the purpose of more precisely interpreting the
deviations from Zipfs law, I use quantile regression method to study where over the range of
city sizes Zipfs law has emerged.
The conventional rank-size regression is given by
ln (Ri;t) = t   t ln (Si;t) + "i;t (1.1)
where i is the city index; Ri and Si denote the size rank and population of city i, respec-
tively;  is the shape parameter of interest; "i;t is the error term.
As discussed in Section II, a large proportion of small cities in the sample might induce
deviation from Zipfs law. The complete sample contains relatively big amount of small cities
than the balanced panel does (Table 1.2). Hence, my discussion is mainly focused on the
time trend of the shape parameter obtained from the balanced panel. For completeness and
comparisons, estimates for both the complete sample and the balanced panel are presented in
Table 1.3. In order to examine the e¤ect of using balanced panel, I include an OLS model with
dummy variable indicating whether the observation is contained in both the complete sample
and the balanced panel (Table 1.9). Table 1.9 shows that the e¤ect of being in the balanced
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panel is signicant for year 1949, 1985-1997, 2000-2007, which coincides with the time range
during which estimates for the complete sample and the balanced panel have bigger di¤erence.
Based on above OLS model, the robust OLS regression could be obtained by adding geog-
raphy and rail dummies:
ln (Ri;t) = t t ln (Si;t)+1;tRiveri+2;tRiveriln (Si;t)+3;tRaili;t+4;tRaili;tln (Si;t)+"i;t
(1.2)
Here, dummy variable Riveri equals 1 if city i is a coastal city or has Yangtze River crossing
it or on its boundary. Raili;t indicates rail year experience, i.e. the census year minus the year
in which city i had its rst rail station if city i had rails earlier than the census year. I take
Yangtze River as a representative of inland water transportation instead of including all the
rivers in China, because it bears most of the water freight in China and many minor rivers
do not have transportation function at all. Table 1.3 presents the parameter estimates for
Equation (1.2) with balanced panel.
In order to identify more precisely where over the ranges of city sizes the rank-size distri-
bution deviates from Zipfs law, I apply a quantile regression model as follows,
ln (Ri;t) = t   t ln (Si;t) + "i;t (1.3)
where  denes quantiles in city rank, e.g. for  = 0:25, the city rank distribution corre-
sponds to the 0.75 quantile in the city size distribution. Here, I adopt the balanced panel as
well as the complete sample to estimate the shape parameter, because the balanced database
only contains 54 observations, which might be inadequate to capture the di¤erence between
di¤erent rages in the quantile regression model. The results are shown in Table 1.4.
I also examine the relationship between city growth and some urban characteristics, such
as initial urban population, urban share and average wage, with control for regional e¤ect.
The OLS regression model is presented as follows
gi;t = 1;t ln (Si;t 1) + 2;twi;t 1 + 3;tli;t 1 + 4;tIEasti + 5;tICentrali + 6;tIWesti + "i;t (1.4)
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where gi;t =
Si;t
Si;t 1   1, measuring the non-agricultural population growth rate of city
i; li;t = ln

Si;t
Ti;t

, measuring the ratio of the non-agricultural population and total urban
population Ti;t (with towns and counties included) of city i; IEasti , ICentrali and IWesti are
regional dummy variables, indicating if city i is located in the east, central or west part
of China, respectively. The identication of regions complies with the o¢ cial classication,
based on geographical position and annual GDP2. Table 1.5 shows the parameter estimates
for Equation (1.4).
1.5.2 Tests
Similar to Dittmar (2009), I apply the OLS model of Gabaix (2008) to test the null hypothesis
that data follow a power law distribution. The test regression is given by
ln (Ri;t   0:5) = 0;t + 1;t ln (Si;t) + 2;t [ln (Si;t)  St ] + "i;t (1.5)
where St 
cov[(ln(Si;t))2;ln(Si;t)]
2var[ln(Si;t)]
. The null hypothesis of a power law is rejected with 99%
condence if and only if
b2;tb21;t
 > 2:572p2n .
One should notice that above test does not exactly examine what this paper mainly con-
cerns, i.e. the validity of Zipfs law. Gabaix (2008) primarily tests the curvature of the
rank-size curve instead of whether the shape parameter  equals 1. It is possible that the
rank-size curves could be tted by straight lines, but their slopes di¤er. Hence, I consider
Students t-test as a supplement.
I use a Students t-test to examine the slope of the regression line, i.e. the null hypothesis
is that 0 = 1. I calculate
tscore =
b   0
SEb = b   1SEb
2Chinese cities are divided into three regions according to geographical locations and economy conditions.
The east part of China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shan-
dong, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Chongqing, Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao, Shenzhen. The central
part covers Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. The west part
includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
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where SEb is the standard error of the shape parameter  and
SEb =
r
1
n 2
Pn
i=1

ln (Rt;i)  \ln (R1;t)
2
rPn
i=1

ln (Si;t)  ln (S1;t)
2
:
The results for Gabaix test and t-test are reported in Table 1.6 and Table 1.2, respectively.
To further examine whether the shape parameter  has signicant changes during the
period 1918-2007, I apply a test for multiple structural breaks developed by Bai and Perron
(1998a and 1998b). Their test considers multiple structural changes in the linear regression
model estimated by OLS and focuses on discrete shifts. Here, the dates of the breaks are
treated as unknown variables and need to be estimated. I test the structural breaks in the
shape parameter  in Equation 1, i.e. ln (Ri;t) = t    ln (Si;t) + "i;t, and report the results
in Table 1.7.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 OLS Regressions
Table 1.3 and 1.4 show the conventional OLS estimates and the estimates for the OLS model
with dummy variables, respectively. For better comparisons, both the estimates based on the
balanced panel and the estimates for the complete sample are reported. The values of estimated
coe¢ cients in Table 1.3 are plotted in Figure 1.1 for the convenience of comparisons.
As may be observed, the estimated  for the balanced panel in Table 1.3 drops from 0.9385
in 1918 to 0.7934 in 1949, increases until 1998 with some reduction during 1961-1963, and
then exhibits mild uctuation for 1999-2007, which roughly forms a Ushape pattern. This
pattern could be explained by Chinas social situation and major changes in public policies.
The large deviation from the Zipfs law in 1949 reects the uneven urban system aggravated
by the civil wars and the Japanese invasion (see Huang, 2006). Recovery from all these social
problems was slow but steady, and population distribution tended to base on the distribution of
natural and social resources. In 1958, Chinese government promoted the Great Leap Forward
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Movement, constructed small cities national wide and encouraged rural population to work in
heavy industries in the cities. This policy did not contribute a lot to Chinas industrialization
but to the rapid growth of urban population. However, this sudden increase in city size was
not well supported by the economy growth. Low productivity caused most of the factories to
shut down very quickly and the unskilled workers, who were former farmers, returned to their
home villages. This was one of the reasons why sharp decline in urban population occurred
right after the boom. The Three-Years Great Famine (1960-1962) was another a huge negative
shock to urbanization, especially to the growth of small cities, which were less supported by
the central government and had relatively large surrounding rural areas. The reduction in
urban population could result from higher motility rates and urban-rural migration, both of
which seemed to have greater impacts on small cities without abundant social and natural
resources. The su¤rage of smaller cities will be shown more clearly by the quantile regression
model later. The Send-Down (or known as the Down to the Countryside Movement, mainly
in 1968) migration caused great population outow in cities as well. During this movement,
many young people in the urban areas were forced to migrate to rural areas and be engaged
in agricultural production. For the Post-Mao Era, Chinese cities grew more naturallyand
exhibited a trend converging to Zipfs law. This recent trend could be explained by the fact
that smaller cities grew relatively rapid for the rst years of Deng Xiaopings economy reform
while the growth of big and medium-size cities caught up as the reform became comprehensive.
The estimates based on the complete sample in Table 1.3 exhibit a similar U shape
pattern, expect that the estimated  shifts upward mildly. According to the discussion in
Section V, I am inclined to take estimates for the balanced panel as better description of the
true city size distribution.
From Table 1.4, it is interesting to notice that the e¤ects of water transportation on the
population size are statistical signicant at the 5% level for the periods 1918-1958 (except
1957, for which year the coe¢ cient is slightly insignicant) and 1987-2007, while the estimated
coe¢ cient for rails is always statistical signicant and getting greater over time. Water trans-
portation and rails in China can be considered as substitute for each other. The period when
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water transportation had less signicant impact on urbanization is coincident with the boom
of railroads freight. The recent increase in the signicance of water transportation could re-
sult from the increased international trades and foreign factories in the coastal cities, such as
Guangzhou and Shantou.
The estimates of shape coe¢ cient  based on the conventional OLS regression model are
plotted in Figure 1.1. Again, it is easily seen that the pattern of coe¢ cients exhibits a U
shape pattern for both balanced panel and complete sample. To be more specic, the rank-
size relation shows the characteristics of Zipfs law for 1918, and then deviation appears for
1949. After 1949, the rank-size relation converges to Zipfs law, with some uctuation during
1999-2007. This gure presents the results in Table 1.3 more clearly.
Figure 1.2 describes the city size distribution for selected years. I have examined the
rank-size relation using data for totally 33 years, but it is unnecessary and messy to plot the
distribution for all these years in one gure. Here, I choose to present distribution for 8 years
based on reasonable time intervals and data availability. Figure 1.2 conrms above results of
the overall trend in city distribution for the time period 1918-2007 as well. For instant, the
regression line exhibits less curvature for 1918, 1988, 1998 and 2007.
1.6.2 Quantile Regression
Table 1.5 presents the estimates of quantile shape coe¢ cient based on Equation 3. Again, to
clearly check the pattern of the estimates and examine where over the ranges of city sizes the
distribution deviates from Zipfs law, I plot the estimates in Figure 1.3. As shown in Table 1.5
and Figure 1.3, larger deviations are rst at the upper quantile of the city size distributions
(i.e. at  = 0:25) and then appear mainly at the lower end (i.e. at  = 0:75). In general, the
quantile regression estimates converge to 1 over time.
These results could be explained by the fact that large cities grew relatively slowly before
Deng Xiaopings economy reform due to the more restrictive regulations on migration, and
yielded deviations from Zipfs law. After Dengs reform, especially after the late 1980s when
his reform policy had been implemented throughout the country, the growth of large cities
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started to catch up and Zipfs law emerged. Also, the Great Leap Forward Movement and the
Send-Down migration caused larger deviations from Zipfs law in 1957 and 1970, respectively.
1.6.3 City Growth and Initial Growth Conditions
Table 1.6 shows the OLS estimates on non-agricultural population growth as a function of
initial conditions, e.g. urban population, average wage and urban population share in the
previous period. I also add regional dummies to control for geographical e¤ects. Here, I use
the balanced panel for 1978, 1988, 1998 and 2008 for better comparisons with equal time
interval.
It is interesting to notice that: (1) the population growth rate and the population in the
previous period were negatively correlated, and the e¤ect of previous population declineed over
time. That is, cities with large population base grew more slowly than the small cities did, but
the di¤erence in growth rates was diminishing. To be more specic, the populations in 1978
and 1988 had signicantly negative impacts on the growth rates in 1988 and 1998 respectively,
while the e¤ect of the population in 1998 on the growth rate in 2008 was insignicant. (2)
On the contrary, the average wages in the previous periods did not have signicantly positive
e¤ects on the population growth until 1988. (3) The initial urban population share seemed
to play a less important role in city growth. (4) Cities appeared to grow quite evenly cross
regions, i.e. the estimates of geographical dummies are closed to each other for the same time
period.
Above results coincide with the modern social reform in China. Although Deng Xiaoping
proposed his reform scheme in 1978, market economy did not become a national wide phe-
nomenon until the late 1980s. The dominance of political matters on city growth was prolong
and lasted until several years after Deng Xiaopings economic reform (approximately 1988).
Before the late 1980s, the income gap between urban and rural areas was not tremendous, and
massive rural-urban migrations were rarely seen. As discussed before, small cities were able
to absorb some migrants from the rural areas nearby due to more accommodative migration
policies. Beneting from Dengs reform, the economic growth in China, especially in the urban
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areas, became dramatically rapid after the late 1980s. The rural-urban income gap has been
greatly increased and urban area became more attractive to young labor. The labor demand
in the cities increases along with the economic growth, indicated by the remarkable boost in
average wage of sta¤ and workers in cities. The increased labor supply and demand achieve a
higher level of equilibrium in the labor market and largely promote city growth.
1.6.4 Gabiax Test and Students T-Test
The parameter estimates for Gabaix test (Equation (1.5) ) are shown in Table 1.7, indicating
that one cannot reject Zipfs law for year 1952, as well as period 1994-2001. This result
is consistent with my previous ndings. One should notice that Gabaix test only tests the
suitability of power law. In other words, it tests whether the rank-size distribution could be
tted by a straight line, instead of whether the shape coe¢ cient  approximately equals 1.
Since the concern in this paper is not limited to the curvature of the distribution, I add a
t-test as a simple supplement based on the conventional OLS model. Results for t-test are
presented in Table 1.3. It shows that the null hypothesis (0 = 1) can be rejected only for the
time period 1949-1975.
1.6.5 Test for Structural Breaks
Table 1.8 reports the estimates for the test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998a and 1998b).
Their test allows inference to be made about the presence of structural change and the
number of breaks. In this study, I set the maximal number of changes as 5, and detect 3
break points, which is reasonable and consistent with my previous OLS estimates. The results
shown in Table 1.8 indicate 3 structural breaks in 1957, 1970 and 1988. These break dates are
approximately coincident with the Great Leap Forward, the Send-Down Movement, and Deng
Xiaopings economic reform, respectively. Details about these events have been discussed in
the previous parts of this section, and will not be repeated here.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have investigated the emergence of Zipfs Law in China with city-level data for
34 years during 1918-2008, including the Pre-Mao data as well as detailed information for the
Mao and Post-Mao eras. To my knowledge, none of the previous literatures on this topic covers
as many years as what is studied in this paper. China went through tremendous structural
changes in the last decades, and urban distribution varied at many points in Chinese history.
Hence, including data for more years could be very important for examining the pattern of
city distribution and deviation from Zipfs Law.
This paper examines the long-run validity of Zipfs Law in China and shows that Zipfs
law emerged recently as a result of relaxing the restrictions on internal migration. Before
the late 1980s, internal migration was strictly regulated and urban distribution was greatly
determined by political matters, e.g. the Great Leap Forward, the Send-Down Movement.
Compared to large cities, the small cities grew relatively rapidly, because rural-urban migration
was less restrictive there and they were able to easily absorb population from the rural areas
nearby. Deng Xiaopings economic reform brought tremendous changes to Chinese economy
and political structures, including the gradual abolition of purchase permits. Starting from
the end of 1980s, the economic conditions became the dominant factor in internal migration
and urban distribution, i.e. wage gap became a main incentive for rural-urban migration
and cities with higher average wages tended to grow faster. As economy develops, Chinese
city distribution converges to the pattern implied by Zipfs law. It is also interesting to
observe the varying roles of di¤erent transportation methods in the urban distribution. Water
transportation had signicant impacts on urbanization, but it was taken over by rails for the
period of rail boost. After 1988, water transportation again became important in determining
city distribution, due to the increasing international trade and foreign factories in coastal cities.
One cautionary note is that my study is limited to the data for 1918 and 33 years during
1949-2008. There might be a suspicion that city growth and urban distribution during the
period from 1919 to 1948 reected patterns that are not fully interpreted in this paper. Wars,
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famines, and changes in governance could cause tumultuous uctuations in population distrib-
ution, either deviating from or converging to Zipfs Law. Completing the analysis on Chinese
urbanization history with richer data is considered as future work in this area.
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1.8 Appendix
Figure 11: Estimates for conventional OLS regression, 1918-2007
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Figure 12: Rank-size plots for selected years
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(a) Complete sample
(b) Balanced panel
Figure 13: Estimates for quantile regression, 1918-2007
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of population and urbanization in China, 1918-
2009
Total population Growth rate City population Growth rate Urban share
(1,000,000) (%) (1,000,000) (%) (%)
Year (1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1)
1949 541.67 - 39.49 - 7.29
1952 574,82 2.04 71.63 27.13 12.46
1957 646.53 2.50 99.49 7.78 15.39
1958 659.94 2.07 107.21 7.76 16.25
1962 672.95 0.49 116.59 2.19 17.33
1965 725.38 2.55 130.45 3.96 17.98
1970 829.92 2.88 144.24 2.11 17.38
1978 962.59 1.39 172.45 2.53 17.92
1980 987.05 2.54 191.40 5.49 19.39
1986 1075.07 1.56 263.66 5.07 24.53
1988 1110.26 1.58 286.61 3.57 25.82
1990 1143.33 1.45 301.91 2.20 26.41
1994 1198.50 1.13 343.01 2.85 28.62
1996 1223.89 1.05 359.50 2.21 29.37
1998 1248.10 0.96 379.42 2.58 30.40
1999 1257.86 0.88 437.48 2.50 34.78
2000 1267.43 0.76 459.06 4.93 36.22
2001 1276.27 0.70 480.64 4.70 37.66
2002 1284.53 0.65 502.12 4.47 39.09
2003 1292.27 0.60 523.76 4.31 40.53
2004 1299.88 0.59 542.83 3.64 41.76
2005 1307.56 0.59 562.12 3.55 42.99
2006 1314.48 0.53 577.06 2.66 43.90
2007 1321.29 0.52 593.79 2.90 44.94
2008 1328.02 0.51 606.67 2.17 45.68
2009 1334.74 0.51 621.86 2.50 46.59
Note: Data from China: Forty Years of Urban Development and China City Statistical
Yearbooks. Calculated by the author.
23
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of complete sample and balanced panel, 1918-
2007
Complete sample
Year Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Obs
1918 111580.2 178485.8 1600000 30000 256
1949 282754.3 515953.3 4200000 50000 94
1952 283520 555004.4 5000000 51500 120
1957 353799.3 669816 6100000 52300 151
1958 357961.3 641353.2 5800000 50500 168
1961 371160.3 681439.2 6400000 51000 184
1962 379955.4 690665.2 6300000 50500 166
1963 408844.4 727273.2 6400000 50900 162
1964 415751.3 734096.1 6400000 53000 158
1965 421806.3 739904.3 6400000 53000 158
1970 397326.3 654285.3 5800000 50600 167
1975 415345.5 647381.1 5500000 53800 178
1978 424113.8 651066.8 5500000 50100 188
1980 419551.9 674536.3 6000000 50400 216
1985 384536.8 666573 6900000 52300 307
1986 364885.2 651622.5 7000000 50200 332
1987 355188.9 648034.6 7100000 50700 361
1988 340054.3 627548.6 7200000 52600 411
1993 519720.4 803750.7 7561000 68600 255
1994 531852.9 824544.1 8103500 57900 259
1995 547994.7 833525.4 8249100 59900 262
1996 565455.6 851400.9 8338000 61300 261
1997 579767.9 859533.7 8417500 65600 262
1998 673300.4 936046.6 8687900 107900 222
1999 675234.7 952925.7 8937200 92200 228
2000 678525.1 972503.4 9231900 97300 235
2001 648403.4 963235.4 9382100 89300 262
2002 667417.7 992923.7 9838400 91300 266
2003 684699.6 1022846 10000000 62000 278
2004 731633.8 1080356 10200000 50400 284
2005 754705 1126801 10800000 51300 282
2006 793933 1176414 11300000 52300 285
2007 816905.6 1205477 11500000 53200 284
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Balanced panel
Year Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Obs
1918 223213.6 268451.7 1500000 32000 54
1949 417480.4 661141.6 4169700 56700 54
1952 486873.1 789596.3 5033800 55500 54
1957 680029.6 1001832 6069700 54200 54
1958 723413 987028.9 5754200 70900 54
1961 798118.5 1098271 6382000 80100 54
1962 759618.5 1079584 6325400 69800 54
1963 779837 1099827 6355300 83900 54
1964 796396.3 1113481 6384500 89100 54
1965 809311.1 1116720 6388500 90900 54
1970 759772.2 1000720 5764200 90900 54
1975 810531.5 1005969 5531300 107700 54
1978 853546.3 1027683 5534700 121800 54
1980 942733.3 1120716 5983400 129400 54
1985 1086485 1264313 6871300 161300 54
1986 1105437 1287940 6987300 163800 54
1987 1139722 1320810 7111300 168700 54
1988 1172617 1346810 7228600 179700 54
1993 1257430 1409344 7561000 217900 54
1994 1295320 1460497 8103500 227200 54
1995 1327522 1482367 8249100 236200 54
1996 1361696 1501547 8338000 242200 54
1997 1389046 1514471 8417500 248300 54
1998 1421681 1556525 8687900 252800 54
1999 1458193 1605169 8937200 253200 54
2000 1494489 1652859 9231900 254700 54
2001 1549750 1706913 9382100 257000 54
2002 1619207 1765025 9838400 257900 54
2003 1720111 1831516 10000000 261900 54
2004 1872228 1902830 10200000 274600 54
2005 1942604 1982478 10800000 277600 54
2006 2082726 2088953 11300000 281500 54
2007 2111709 2140188 11500000 282800 54
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Table 1.3: Estimates for the OLS regression models without dummies, 1918-
2007
Complete Sample Balanced Panel
Year Estimates Obs R2 t-test Estimates Obs R2 t-test
1918 1.2498** 256 0.9901 32.0256 0.9385** 54 0.944 -1.9401
(0.0078) (0.0317)
1949 0.9735** 94 0.9859 -0.0269 0.7934** 54 0.9307 -6.8867
(0.0121) (0.0300)
1952 1.0110** 120 0.9921 1.3253 0.8130** 54 0.9398 -6.5614
(0.0083) (0.0285)
1957 0.9498** 151 0.9807 -4.6055 0.8200** 54 0.9313 -5.8252
(0.0109) (0.0309)
1958 0.9624** 168 0.9702 -2.8702 0.8617** 54 0.9233 -4.0087
(0.0131) (0.0345)
1961 0.9486** 184 0.9674 -3.9845 0.8496** 54 0.923 -4.4235
(0.0129) (0.0340)
1962 0.9653** 166 0.9705 -2.6489 0.8459** 54 0.9283 -4.727
(0.0131) (0.0326)
1963 0.9467** 162 0.9699 -4.0379 0.8453** 54 0.9326 -4.9111
(0.0132) (0.0315)
1964 0.9689** 158 0.9722 -2.374 0.8456** 54 0.9322 -4.8861
(0.0131) (0.0316)
1965 0.968 158 0.9727 -2.4806 0.8551 54 0.9335 -4.571
(0.0129) (0.0317)
1970 0.9864 167 0.9597 -0.8662 0.8903 54 0.9356 -3.3858
(0.0157) (0.0324)
1975 1.0085** 178 0.9551 0.5152 0.9278** 54 0.9351 -2.1298
(0.0165) (0.0339)
1978 1.0150** 188 0.9501 0.8772 0.9510** 54 0.9359 -1.4203
(0.0171) (0.0345)
1980 0.9863** 216 0.9472 -0.8616 0.9481** 54 0.9317 -1.4577
(0.0159) (0.0356)
1985 1.0383** 307 0.9622 3.2458 0.9816** 54 0.9344 -0.5097
(0.0118) (0.0361)
1986 1.0398** 332 0.9657 3.6852 0.9813** 54 0.9345 -0.5194
(0.0108) (0.0360)
1987 1.0483** 361 0.9685 4.83 0.9835** 54 0.9348 -0.4583
(0.0100) (0.0360)
1988 1.0728** 411 0.9724 8.1798 0.9916** 54 0.9366 -0.2346
(0.0089) (0.0357)
1993 1.0572 255 0.9479 3.6667 1.0202** 54 0.9402 0.5658
(0.0156) (0.0357)
1994 1.0649** 259 0.944 4.006 1.0351** 54 0.9419 0.9832
(0.0162) (0.0357)
1995 1.0824** 262 0.942 4.9341 1.0446** 54 0.9429 1.2493
(0.0167) (0.0357)
1996 1.0944** 261 0.9441 5.7212 1.0560** 54 0.9453 1.5909
(0.0165) (0.0352)
1997 1.1023** 262 0.9416 6.0176 1.0632** 54 0.9446 1.7703
(0.0170) (0.0357)
1998 1.1749** 222 0.9536 9.9943 1.0679** 54 0.9462 1.9235
(0.0175) (0.0353)
1999 1.1662** 228 0.9511 9.4432 1.0627** 54 0.947 1.7966
(0.0176) (0.0349)
26
2000 1.1806** 235 0.9561 10.8795 1.0612** 54 0.9458 1.7386
(0.0166) (0.0352)
2001 1.1673** 262 0.9592 11.2282 1.0554** 54 0.9442 1.5562
(0.0149) (0.0356)
2002 1.1452** 266 0.9553 9.5526 1.0552** 54 0.9389 1.4799
(0.0152) (0.0373)
2003 1.0941** 278 0.9408 5.703 1.0594** 54 0.935 1.5349
(0.0165) (0.0387)
2004 1.0371** 284 0.9246 2.108 1.0498** 54 0.9213 1.169
(0.0176) (0.0426)
2005 1.0210** 282 0.9232 1.1932 1.0363** 54 0.918 0.8462
(0.0176) (0.0429)
2006 1.0051** 285 0.9176 0.2849 0.9960** 54 0.9027 -0.0881
(0.0179) (0.0454)
2007 1.0066** 284 0.9169 0.3667 1.0143** 54 0.9117 0.3265
(0.0180) (0.0438)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ** denotes signicance at the 5% level.
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Table 1.4: Estimates for the OLS regression models with dummies (Equation
2), 1918-2007
Balanced Panel
Year  1 2 3 4 Obs R2
1918 0.7610** 1.5085** 0.0764** -0.1267** -0.0071** 54 0.9773
(0.0321) (0.5792) (0.0228) (0.0486) (0.0019)
1949 0.5318** 2.0076** 0.0565** -0.1583** -0.0047** 54 0.9623
(0.0482) (0.6082) (0.0129) (0.0494) (0.0010)
1952 0.5669** 1.7235** 0.0567** -0.1360** -0.0047** 54 0.9648
(0.0483) (0.5928) (0.0120) (0.0475) (0.0010)
1957 0.5669** 1.7235** 0.0567** -0.1360** -0.0045** 54 0.9546
(0.0483) (0.5928) (0.0120) (0.0475) (0.0010)
1958 0.6025** 1.5115** 0.0710** -0.1156 -0.0054** 54 0.9532
(0.0598) (0.7704) (0.0142) (0.0591) (0.0011)
1961 0.5416** 1.2179 0.0792** -0.0905 -0.0061** 54 0.9589
(0.0598) (0.7181) (0.0130) (0.0548) (0.0010)
1962 0.5615** 1.0633 0.0702** -0.0797 -0.0054** 54 0.9582
(0.0587) (0.7132) (0.0129) (0.0546) (0.001)
1963 0.5830** 1.1465 0.0649** -0.0894 -0.0050** 54 0.9617
(0.0565) (0.6804) (0.0122) (0.0521) (0.0009)
1964 0.5649** 0.853 0.0680** -0.0651 -0.0054** 54 0.9636
(0.0556) (0.6652) (0.0118) (0.0508) (0.0009)
1965 0.5774** 0.9001 0.0676** -0.0695 -0.0052** 54 0,9639
(0.0565) (0.6730) (0.0118) (0.0513) (0.0009)
1970 0.6028** 0.7384 0.0669** -0.0559 -0.0052** 54 0.9644
(0.0601) (0.6949) (0.0116) (0.0531) (0.0009)
1975 0.6174** 0.9075 0.0650** -0.0688 -0.0050** 54 0.9621
(0.0671) (0.7521) (0.0122) (0.0570) (0.0009)
1978 0.6290** 1.0641 0.0635** -0.0799 -0.0048** 54 0.9611
(0.0710) (0.7834) (0.0125) (0.0591) (0.0010)
1980 0.5900** 1.4142 0.0665** -0.1061 -0.0050** 54 0.9603
(0.0737) (0.8003) (0.0128) (0.0599) (0.0010)
1985 0.5977** 1.4602 0.0696** -0.1074 -0.0052** 54 0.9646
(0.0737) (0.7949) (0.0122) (0.0587) (0.0009)
1986 0.5861** 1.5073 0.0699** -0.1108 -0.0053** 54 0.9652
(0.0741) (0.7875) (0.0121) (0.0581) (0.0009)
1987 0.5797 1.7035** 0.0696 -0.1251** -0.0052** 54 0.966
(0.0743) (0.7832) (0.0120) (0.0577) (0.0009)
1988 0.5897** 1.6506** 0.0688** -0.1212** -0.0051** 54 0.967
(0.0741) (0.7793) (0.0119) (0.0572) (0.0009)
1993 0.6104** 1.6496** 0.0668** -0.1188** -0.0049** 54 0.9681
(0.0770) (0.7938) (0.0119) (0.0580) (0.0009)
1994 0.6140** 1.6569** 0.0654** -0.1182** -0.0048** 54 0.9674
(0.0786) (0.8129) (0.0121) (0.0592) (0.0009)
1995 0.6294** 1.6000** 0.0662** -0.1140** -0.0049** 54 0.9697
(0.0760) (0.7920) (0.0115) (0.0576) (0.0008)
1996 0.6425** 1.7592** 0.0639** -0.1269** -0.0047** 54 0.9725
(0.0727) (0.7601) (0.0109) (0.0551) (0.0008)
1997 0.6405** 1.7345** 0.0656** -0.1253** -0.0048** 54 0.9725
(0.0734) (0.7667) (0.0109) (0.0555) (0.0008)
1998 0.6436** 1.7220** 0.0655** -0.1233** -0.0048** 54 0.9735
(0.0726) (0.7580) (0.0108) (0.0548) (0.0008)
1999 0.6514** 1.6397** 0.0649** -0.1156** -0.0047** 54 0.9736
(0.0712) (0.7487) (0.0105) (0.0540) (0.0008)
28
2000 0.6270** 1.7730** 0.0668** -0.1256** -0.0049** 54 0.9749
(0.0690) (0.7321) (0.0101) (0.0527) (0.0008)
2001 0.5799** 2.1098** 0.0700** -0.1500** -0.0051** 54 0.9775
(0.0655) (0.6911) (0.0095) (0.0496) (0.0007)
2002 0.5651** 2.3014** 0.0700** -0.1651** -0.0051** 54 0.9747
(0.0699) (0.7372) (0.0102) (0.0527) (0.0008)
2003 0.5761** 2.9881** 0.0653** -0.2113** -0.0047** 54 0.9697
(0.0766) (0.8213) (0.0113) (0.0584) (0.0008)
2004 0.6369** 4.3024** 0.0519** -0.3040** -0.0036** 54 0.9578
(0.0789) (0.9413) (0.0117) (0.0664) (0.0008)
2005 0.6210** 4.1947** 0.0515** -0.2961** -0.0036** 54 0.9544
(0.0815) (0.9713) (0.0121) (0.0684) (0.0009)
2006 0.5913** 4.7288** 0.0494** -0.3334** -0.0034** 54 0.9452
(0.0866) (1.0454) (0.0131) (0.0733) (0.0009)
2007 0.5904** 4.6077** 0.0508** -0.3236** -0.0036** 54 0.952
(0.0833) (0.9880) (0.0122) (0.0692) (0.0009)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ** denotes signicance at the 5% level.
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Table 1.5: Estimates of the shape parameter in the quantile regression model
(Equation 3), 1918-2007
Complete sample Balanced panel
Year  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75 Obs  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 0:75 Obs
1918 1.2585 1.2323 1.2184 256 0.9124 0.8331 0.7882 54
(0.0174) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0927) (0.0656) (0.0435)
1949 0.9385 0.931 0.9158 94 0.7938 0.7178 0.8318 54
(0.0493) (0.0193) (0.0159) (0.0664) (0.0644) (0.1344)
1952 0.9917 0.9849 0.9528 120 0.8241 0.7904 0.7764 54
(0.0251) (0.0083) (0.0139) (0.0629) (0.0740) (0.0554)
1957 0.9432 0.8649 0.8621 151 0.7834 0.7856 0.706 54
(0.0360) (0.0091) (0.0256) (0.0631) (0.0825) (0.0881)
1958 0.9107 0.8758 0.9003 168 0.8096 0.8821 0.7961 54
(0.0244) (0.0176) (0.0207) (0.0875) (0.0657) (0.0998)
1961 0.9508 0.8397 0.7799 184 0.7862 0.8855 0.8043 54
(0.0312) (0.0207) (0.0136) (0.0891) (0.0999) (0.1181)
1962 0.9662 0.8747 0.8133 166 0.8008 0.8707 0.7853 54
(0.0448) (0.0293) (0.0319) (0.0721) (0.0959) (0.0986)
1963 0.9351 0.8413 0.8092 162 0.7933 0.8566 0.7746 54
(0.0210) (0.0307) (0.0198) (0.0659) (0.0761) (0.0976)
1964 0.9671 0.8674 0.8214 158 0.7959 0.8579 0.7491 54
(0.0339) (0.0253) (0.0191) (0.0703) (0.1221) (0.0987)
1965 0.9644 0.8614 0.8319 158 0.8058 0.8805 0.7536 54
(0.0386) (0.0211) (0.0153) (0.0639) (0.0693) (0.0568)
1970 0.9793 0.9005 0.8731 167 0.8321 0.86 0.8197 54
(0.0511) (0.0221) (0.0202) (0.0635) (0.0944) (0.0572)
1975 1.0369 0.9172 0.9091 178 0.8921 0.9424 0.7865 54
(0.0451) (0.0273) (0.0126) (0.0681) (0.1081) (0.1191)
1978 0.9907 0.9189 0.9556 188 0.925 0.939 0.8197 54
(0.0534) (0.0310) (0.0144) (0.0782) (0.0994) (0.0883)
1980 0.9517 0.9211 0.9558 216 0.9327 0.9163 0.8069 54
(0.0557) (0.0132) (0.0221) (0.0454) (0.0571) (0.0875)
1985 0.9565 0.9965 1.0174 307 1.0137 0.9219 0.8492 54
(0.0331) (0.0174) (0.0243) (0.0778) (0.1091) (0.1454)
1986 0.9577 1.001 1.0321 332 0.9595 0.9194 0.8345 54
(0.0264) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0888) (0.0872) (0.1216)
1987 0.9833 1.0196 1.0523 361 0.9778 0.9189 0.8307 54
(0.2919) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0668) (0.0825) (0.1261)
1988 1.0064 1.0571 1.0688 411 0.9865 0.9331 0.8278 54
(0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0103) (0.0742) (0.0682) (0.1435)
1993 1.0314 1.0473 0.9865 255 1.0167 0.9314 0.8663 54
(0.0493) (0.0254) (0.0497) (0.0672) (0.0973) (0.1245)
1994 1.0323 1.0803 1.0649 259 1.0648 1.0338 0.9484 54
(0.0537) (0.0378) (0.0435) (0.0597) (0.0885) (0.0781)
1995 1.056 1.0962 1.1296 262 1.0636 0.9454 0.9804 54
(0.0504) (0.0208) (0.0104) (0.0572) (0.0990) (0.1317)
1996 1.0747 1.1244 1.1414 261 1.0731 0.9552 1.0015 54
(0.0555) (0.0248) (0.0167) (0.0532) (0.0974) (0.1213)
1997 1.0606 1.1608 1.159 262 1.0707 0.9728 0.9573 54
(0.0560) (0.01839) (0.0120) (0.0712) (0.0778) (0.1315)
1998 1.1942 1.1943 1.2018 222 1.0713 1.0027 0.9144 54
(0.0456) (0.0161) (0.0228) (0.0757) (0.0982) (0.1635)
1999 1.213 1.1979 1.2052 228 1.0605 0.999 0.9278 54
(0.0522) (0.0165) (0.0123) (0.0730) (0.0626) (0.1198)
30
2000 1.2144 1.2136 1.2205 235 1.065 1.0034 0.9555 54
(0.0335) (0.0159) (0.0085) (0.0779) (0.0680) (0.1259)
2001 1.1672 1.201 1.2141 262 1.0485 1.0067 0.9542 54
(0.0417) (0.0324) (0.0236) (0.0788) (0.0463) (0.1159)
2002 1.1578 1.1667 1.1768 266 1.0838 1.0161 0.9355 54
(0.0386) (0.0263) (0.0284) (0.0789) (0.0672) (0.1292)
2003 1.0955 1.1264 1.1337 278 1.0789 0.9721 1.0471 54
(0.0465) (0.0334) (0.0386) (0.0961) (0.0601) (0.1512)
2004 1.0585 1.0711 1.0354 284 1.0056 0.9864 1.039 54
(0.0340) (0.0214) (0.0602) (0.0951) (0.0413) (0.1328)
2005 1.0204 1.0532 1.0178 282 0.9929 0.9402 1.0449 54
(0.0583) (0.0514) (0.0698) (0.1367) (0.1048) (0.1022)
2006 1.0148 1.0025 0.9889 285 0.9159 0.8477 0.9262 54
(0.0457) (0.0417) (0.0916) (0.1166) (0.0456) (0.0693)
2007 1.0214 1.0178 1.0513 284 0.9526 0.9656 0.9781 54
(0.0484) (0.0269) (0.0700) (0.1362) (0.0600) (0.0551)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All the estimates are signicance at
the 5% level.
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Table 1.6: City growth and initial growth conditions (Equation 4), 1918-2008
DV=Ci tyPop1988Ci tyPop1978   1 DV=Ci tyPop1998Ci tyPop1988   1 DV=Ci tyPop2008Ci tyPop1998   1
ln (Ci tyPop1978) -0.3259** ln (Ci tyPop1988) -0.2806** ln (Ci tyPop1998) -0.0883
(0.0606) (0.0500) (0.0611)
Wgae 1978 -0.0272 Wgae 1988 0.3183** Wgae 1998 0.0871**
(0.3298) (0.1318) (0.0201)
ln

Ci tyPop1978
TotalPop1978

-0.2337 ln

Ci tyPop1988
TotalPop1988

0.2084 ln

Ci tyPop1998
TotalPop1998

-0.1713
(0.2573) (0.1814) (0.2344)
East 4.9398** East 3.4596** East 1.2535
(0.7260) (0.6619) (0.7975)
Central 4.7666** Central 3.3508** Central 0.9802
(0.7467) (0.6675) (0.8038)
West 4.5580** West 3.3689** West 1.0925
(0.7305) (0.6496) (0.7827)
Obs 43 Obs 43 Obs 43
R2 0.8166 R2 0.7834 R2 0.7434
Note: I use the o¢ cial division of the three geographic regions. East includes Beijing, Tian-
jin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan.
Central region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hu-
nan. West includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Ningxia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** denotes signicance at the 5% level.
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Table 1.7: Estimates for Gabiax test regression (Equation 5), 1918-2007
Balanced panel
Year 1 2 Reject Zipfs law
1918 -1.0096 -0.2740 Yes
(0.0164) (0.0163)
1949 -0.8555 -0.1862 Yes
(0.0079) (0.0056)
1952 -0.8773 -0.1788 No
(0.0101) (0.0073)
1957 -0.8832 -0.2131 Yes
(0.0079) (0.0061)
1958 -0.9281 -0.2369 Yes
(0.0101) (0.008)
1961 -0.9149 -0.2354 Yes
(0.0090) (0.0071)
1962 -0.9113 -0.2225 Yes
(0.0090) (0.0070)
1963 -0.9104 -0.2237 Yes
(0.0095) (0.0076)
1964 -0.9105 -0.2270 Yes
(0.0099) (0.0080)
1965 -0.9207 -0.2313 Yes
(0.0100) (0.0082)
1970 -0.9587 -0.2484 Yes
(0.0094) (0.0081)
1975 -0.9988 -0.2674 Yes
(0.0120) (0.0107)
1978 -1.0237 -0.2775 Yes
(0.0134) (0.0122)
1980 -1.0203 -0.2841 Yes
(0.0137) (0.0125)
1985 -1.057 -0.2928 Yes
(0.0128) (0.0118)
1986 -1.0567 -0.2921 Yes
(0.0134) (0.0124)
1987 -1.0589 -0.295 Yes
(0.0136) (0.0127)
1988 -1.0677 -0.2988 Yes
(0.0134) (0.0127)
1993 -1.0987 -0.3090 Yes
(0.0138) (0.0135)
1994 -1.1156 -0.3048 No
(0.0122) (0.0117)
1995 -1.1259 -0.3111 No
(0.0119) (0.0116)
1996 -1.1381 -0.3168 No
(0.0107) (0.0107)
1997 -1.1458 -0.3240 No
(0.0105) (0.0105)
1998 -1.1512 -0.3198 No
(0.0103) (0.0103)
1999 -1.1455 -0.3149 No
(0.0107) (0.0106)
33
2000 -1.1441 -0.3128 No
(0.0110) (0.0108)
2001 -1.1374 -0.3119 No
(0.0135) (0.0133)
2002 -1.1371 -0.3235 Yes
(0.0125) (0.0122)
2003 -1.1411 -0.3370 Yes
(0.0128) (0.0126)
2004 -1.1292 -0.3654 Yes
(0.0155) (0.0154)
2005 -1.1144 -0.3660 Yes
(0.0156) (0.0154)
2006 -1.0693 -0.3818 Yes
(0.0209) (0.0213)
2007 -1.0900 -0.3716 Yes
(0.0156) (0.0154)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 1.8: Test for multiple structural breaks (Equation 1), 1918-2007
BIC specications: q = 1; p = 1; h = 4;m = 5; eps1 = 0:15
Complete sample Balanced panel
Number of breaks 3 3
Break dates 1957, 1988, 2000 1957, 1988, 2000
Note: I adopt the BIC model of Bai and Perron (1998a and 1998b). Here, q is the number
of repressors z; p is the number of repressors x; m is the maximum number of structural
changes allowed; eps1 is the value of the trimming (in percentage) for the construction and
critical values of the supF tests; h is set at int(eps1*bigt). There are ve options: eps1 = .05,
.10, .15, .20 or .25. For each option, the maximal value of m above is: 10 for eps1 = .05; 8 for
eps1 = .10, 5 for eps1 = .15, 3 for eps1 = .20 and 2 for eps1 = .25.
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Table 1.9: Estimates for the OLS regression models with balanced dummy,
1918-2007
Year  0 Obs R2
1918 -1.2492** -0.0022 256 0.9901
(0.0089) (0.0167)
1949 0.9868** 0.0553** 94 0.9867
(0.0133) (0.0251)
1952 1.0155** 0.0158 120 0.9921
(0.0097) (0.0180)
1957 0.9549** 0.0198 151 0.9807
(0.0129) (0.0265)
1958 0.9658** 0.0126 168 0.9702
(0.0158) (0.0327)
1961 0.9515** 0.0113 184 0.9674
(0.0155) (0.0336)
1962 0.9695** 0.0163 166 0.9705
(0.0155) (0.0320)
1963 0.9522** 0.0226 162 0.9699
(0.0153) (0.0319)
1964 0.9729** 0.0158 158 0.9722
(0.0153) (0.0311)
1965 0.9741** 0.0233 158 0.973
(0.0152) (0.0309)
1970 0.9878** 0.0056 167 0.9598
(0.0183) (0.0368)
1975 1.0094** 0.0036 178 0.9551
(0.0193) (0.0386)
1978 1.0091** -0.0222 188 0.9501
(0.0202) (0.0406)
1980 0.9716** -0.0576 216 0.9472
(0.0192) (0.0417)
1985 1.0093** -0.1177** 307 0.9636
(0.0143) (0.0343)
1986 1.0105** -0.1210** 332 0.9657
(0.0132) (0.0327)
1987 1.0170** -0.1361** 361 0.9685
(0.0121) (0.0310)
1988 1.0381** -0.1533** 411 0.9742
(0.0108) (0.0286)
1993 1.0330** -0.0914** 255 0.9479
(0.0189) (0.0408)
1994 1.0352** -0.1111** 259 0.9455
(0.0196) (0.0422)
1995 1.0518** -0.1140** 262 0.942
(0.0201) (0.0427)
1996 1.0640** -0.1114** 261 0.9456
(0.0200) (0.0421)
1997 1.0686** -0.1224** 262 0.9434
(0.0205) (0.0429)
1998 1.1594** -0.0515 222 0.9539
(0.0210) (0.0389)
1999 1.1458** -0.0683 228 0.9511
(0.0212) (0.0398)
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2000 1.1577** -0.0759** 235 0.9569
(0.0200) (0.0377)
2001 1.1420** -0.0863** 262 0.96
(0.0182) (0.0363)
2002 1.1162** -0.1011** 266 0.9553
(0.0186) (0.0379)
2003 1.0531** -0.1514** 278 0.9434
(0.0199) (0.0430)
2004 0.9870** -0.1968** 284 0.9288
(0.0211) (0.0479)
2005 0.9752** -0.1818** 282 0.9269
(0.0211) (0.0486)
2006 0.9596** -0.1883** 285 0.9216
(0.0212) (0.0497)
2007 0.9539** -0.2153** 284 0.9221
(0.0213) (0.0498)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ** denotes signicance at the 5% level.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Privatization on E¢ ciency and
Protability: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms,
2001-2010
2.1 Introduction
Privatization, primarily dened as the deliberate sale by a government of state owned enter-
prises (SOEs) or assets to the private sector, can date as far back as Ancient Greece period,
and then occurred worldwide. When referring to privatization in modern literature, people
mainly focus attention on the privatization processes in East Europe and China. China has
witnessed tremendous economic and social reforms for the past three decades, of which SOE
reform is an integral part. The SOE reform was began by implementing contract responsi-
bility and shareholding system in the 1980s, but the privatization process was slow until the
modern corporate system was established in 1993. In 1998, 39.2% of the industrial rms are
SOEs, but the proportion fell to 22.7% in 2002. As the privatization policy spreading over the
whole nation with all the industries included, the share of industrial SOEs has further shrunk
and was only 8.3% in 2006. Privatization also brings tremendous changes in Chinese labor
market, characterized by the increasing unemployment. According to the Governments Work
report in 2005, the total numbers of laid-o¤ workers from SOEs were 6,000,000, 4,100,000,
2,600,000, and 1,530,000 in the previous four years, and a mass of unemployment was from
rms under privatization. Throughout the privatization process in China, the establishment
of stock market plays a pivotal role and provides a direct and e¢ cient measure for ownership
transition.
This paper addresses the impacts of privatization of Chinese listed SOEs on employment,
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wages, and rm performance by analyzing data for 2000-2010. The major nding is that the
privatization is a major spur to increased e¢ ciency and protability, and lead to a reduction
in employment as well. This result is consistent with some previous studies while contradicts
with others (see, e.g. Chen, et al., 2006), and contributes to the debate on whether and
how privatization increases e¢ ciency and protability in the sense that it is based on newly
collected data for listed rms in China. As I discuss later in the paper, there are good reasons
to suspect that empirical ndings relying on survey data for very limited industries and/or
regions might be biased. The data used here have many advantages. First, the accounting
and reporting systems of listed rms are supervised and regulated by securities regulators,
such as China Securities Regulatory Commission. Hence, the annual reports of listed rms
provide more accurate and reliable data about corporate governance, nancial activities and
rm performance. Second, my data cover 226 listed rms in over 100 cities (including counties)
and 21 industries for 2000-2010. These rms are located in the east, west and middle part
of China. That is, my study is not limited to the developed cities or rural areas like many
other papers are (see, e.g. Li and Rozelle, 2001). Also, a long-run study encompassing 11 years
provides a great opportunity to examine both immediate and perennial e¤ects of privatization.
Third, since Chinese listed rms are consistently identied by stock IDs (STKID), I am able
to match rm data from di¤erent sources and track a rm as long as it is listed. This unique
feature encourages further investigation of my study on privatization in China.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides history of
privatization all over the world, with background and process of Chinas privatization empha-
sized. Section III briey reviews some of the literature on privatization, emphasizing debates
on the di¤erences between SOEs and privately owned rms in both theoretical and empirical
aspects. Section IV provides a theoretical model to characterize di¤erences between SOEs and
privately owned rms, providing a formal setting to explain how privatization could improve
e¢ ciency and protability. The data utilized in this paper are discussed in Section V. Here, I
also discuss advantages and possible improvement of my data. Section VI describes a frame-
work to examine the impacts of privatization, followed by the corresponding empirical results
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and discussion in Section VII. Concluding remarks are presented in section VIII.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Privatization as a Worldwide Phenomenon
The word privatization could be broadly referred to as either transferring ownership of an
enterprise or public property from the public sector to the private sector or outsourcing public
services to private rms (see Chowdhury, 2006). An example of ownership transformation
is selling the entire SOE (or most part of it) to a strategic private investor through auction
or insider privatization. Government outsourcing usually occurs for some very specic and
limited public services and functions, such as revenue collection and law enforcement. The pri-
vatization of rm ownership has been in use worldwide, and its impacts on rm performance,
corporate governance, social structure, etc. are of great interest in transition economics lit-
erature. As many previous studies, this paper focuses on the ownership transition of SOEs,
instead of government outsourcing.
The early history of privatization could date as far as Ancient Greece, and mainly associated
with government outscoring. The Roman Republic used private sectors for tax collection,
construction, and many other public services (see Parker and Saal, 2003). Then, privatization
of rm (or organization) ownership was more and more used in practice. The China Empire
was one among the countries that rst adopted ownership transition. Followed the idea of
loose government control in the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644) created many privately owned enterprises by privatization, mainly in the manufacturing
industries (see Buoye, 2000). There are also examples of privatization from the European
countries and Southern America. The Great Britain privatized its common lands during the
Industrial Revolution (1760-1840). In the 1950s, the British steel industry was privatized by
Winston Churchills government (see Parker and Saal, 2003). In Chile, many SOEs were sold by
the government during 1973-1990, and this privatization process slowly continued thereafter.
In 1989, the government of Margaret Thatcher partly privatized the public regional water
authorities in England and Wales, and after the Railways Act 1993, the railway industry in
40
the UK was privatized. Other European countries, such as Germany, Italy and Spain, also
launched large privatization programs by o¤ering public share in 1990s (see Megginson and
Netter, 2001). The Deutsche Bundespost (German Federal Post O¢ ce) was privatized in
1995 and is now known as Deutsche Post AG, the worlds largest courier company. Similarly,
Japan Post is undergoing full privatization as part of the governments long-term reform bill
passed in 2007. One of the most signicant privatizations in recent times occurred in the
former Soviet Union countries in the 1990s. Russia, as an example, has been privatizing its
SOEs since 1988, and shifted its economy from centrally planned economy towards market
economy through privatization. Privatization in Russia covers a large range of industries and
the process is continuing. Russian experience shares some common features with Chinas
recent privatization due to their similar initial conditions.
2.2.2 Privatization in Post-Mao China
Quite closed to the social situation in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, meeting
the domestic demand for consumption goods and increasing government receipts became piv-
otal issues for the Chinese government to maintain social stability after the Mao Era. Economic
reform, aiming at transferring centrally planned economy to market economy, appeared to be a
necessary step to take at this point. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated his economic reform plan
in selected regions and allowed more private control in agricultural industry. The basic idea
of economic reform was improving economic e¢ ciency and protability through reducing or
eliminating government control of markets. Policies used to loose government control included
removal of production quotas and price controls, encouraging labor mobility and private busi-
ness. As private sectors began to gain market share and show their advantages, selling some
low-performing SOEs became viable. Then small-scale privatization of SOEs slowly spread
out to larger areas and more industries, corresponding with corruption and increased ination.
Corruption and ination, also witnessed by the Russian privatization, are primarily caused
by the lack of regulation of privatization procedure and the establishment of market structure.
Hence, setting up the modern corporate system and privatizing SOEs through shareholding
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system became a necessary step in economic reform. At the end of 1990, Deng Xiaoping
reopened the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SSE) and then founded the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change (SZSE), which provided the possibility for rm listing and share trading. All SOEs
were strongly encouraged to be transformed into corporate entities, either being limited share
companies or share holding companies (see Lee, 2004). After selected SOEs converted into
companies with share capital, some of them were sold (either completely or partially) to pri-
vate sectors, such as nancial institutions and individual investors, through trading existing
state-owned shares or issuing new shares to the private sectors (see Chen et al., 2006). Fur-
thermore, privatization by foreign investors was visible. In 1993, some SOEs were allowed to
list in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) and overseas stock exchanges such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). In order to maintain eco-
nomic development and social stability, the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), the Peoples Bank of China (PBC), and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) in advance determine the maximum number of privatizations in each province for each
calendar year. By the end of 2001, more than 1,000 listed SOEs were completely or partially
privatized (see Chen et al., 2006).
Small SOEs that were not corporatized could be privatized through auction or insider
privatization as well. The ownership and control of most of the small SOEs owned by local
governments, such as township governments, were transferred to groups of insiders (that is, in-
dividuals who were working in or managing the rms prior to privatization) (see Li and Rozelle,
2004). Mainly through these less regulated but very e¤ective channels, local governments had
privatized more than half a million township SOEs by the late 1990s (see Oi, 1999).
2.3 Previous Studies
The debate on the e¢ ciency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) versus private rms is of great
interest in the literature on transition economy. The theoretical basis of the impact of rm
ownership on its performance is controversial, and empirical studies using di¤erent data or
methodologies provide mixed ndings even for the same country within the same time period.
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2.3.1 Theories
Theories in the controversy on the e¢ ciency di¤erence between SOEs and private rms can be
generally summarized as: the ownership view, the competition view, and the governance view
(see, e.g. Hu et al., 2004; Chen, et al., 2006). The ownership view claims that the SOEs are less
e¢ cient by nature, because they are established for some political and social purposes, such
as social stability, full employment and income redistribution, instead of prot maximization.
This view has some supporters in the eld of transition economics, such as Krueger (1990),
Boycko et al. (1996), and Bai et al. (2000). A weaker argument is the competition view,
suggesting the product-market competition faced by private rms can reduce managerial slack
and provide information about manager e¤ort (see, e.g. Holmstrom, 1982; Yarrow, 1986).
This opinion is doubted by researchers, such as Ickes et al. (1995) and Blanchard and Kremer
(1997), in the sense that competition could yield negative e¤ects on e¢ ciency as well. The
governance view considers the aspect of corporate governance and believes the private rms
can solve the principal-agent issue better because they have clearer ownership, and so on (see,
e.g. Alchian, 1965).
Overall, none of the three views fully dominates the others in literature, and all of them
have focused on narrow aspects of reason for e¢ ciency gain/loss. In this paper, I base my
theoretical analysis primarily on the ownership view, and consider the e¤ect of corporate
governance using empirical evidence as well. Furthermore, I examine the relationship between
ownership and job destruction under transition through both a theoretical model and empirical
study.
2.3.2 Empirical Studies
There is a substantial literature on empirical study of the relationship between rm ownership
and its performance, focused mainly on data for Central and Eastern European countries
and P. R. China. The generally used measures for rm performance include total factor
productivity (TFP), labor productivity, protability, and sales. Largely depending on the
data and methodologies used, ndings range from those showing signicant positive e¤ects of
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privatization on performance to those concluding that ownership does not have a signicant
e¤ect on performance, to those observing signicant negative e¤ects. For instance, Brown and
Earle (2001) use a sample of 79343 observations in Russia for 1992-1999 and nd that the TFP
is signicantly higher in private rms, while they later nd a negative e¤ect of privatization
using a smaller sample and random growth models (see Brown , Earle and Telegdy, 2006). Hu
et al. (2004) show signicant positive e¤ects of privatization on TFP for their sample of 736
observations in ve Chinese cities from 1996 to 2001, while Dong et al. (2006) conclude that
the TFP is higher in SOEs in urban area and has no signicant di¤erence between SOEs and
private rms in rural area, using a sample of 165 observations in Nanjing city for 1994-2001.
Hu et al. (2006) also nd a positive e¤ect of privatization on labor productivity (i.e., total
sales scaled by number of workers), while some other studies do not nd any signicant e¤ect
for Chinese data (see, e.g. Li and Rozelle, 2004). Je¤erson and Su (2006) show a higher
prot-sales ratio for private rms using 20749 observations over 1995-2001, while Dong et al.
(2006) nd the same ratio is higher in the SOEs in urban area and higher in the private rms
in rural area.
The variation in empirical results is brought about by several reasons. First, ownership
is treated di¤erently in regressions, measured either as a categorical concept (e.g. the type
of ownership, or the type of ultimate control group for listed rms) or the exact extent of
ownership (e.g. the percentage of private-owned shares). Even under the same treatment of
ownership, classication of rms might di¤er. For example, Hu et al. (2004) dene SOEs as
the rms that the state owns 100 percent shares, while Chen et al. (2006) use the type of
the dominant shareholder to identify rms ownership. Second, samples used in many studies
are small and cover very limited regions and/or industries (see, e.g. Li and Rozelle, 2001; Hu,
et al., 2004; Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007). The representativeness of sample is more critical
for research on privatization in China, because China has undergone tremendous regional and
industrial di¤erences during transition while Chinese data are not as plenteous as data for the
Central and Eastern Europe. Third, studies covering a short time period might be able to
capture phenomenon happened immediately before and after privatization, but their results
44
is possibly to contradict some long-run ndings (see, e.g. Hu et al., 2004; Je¤erson and Su,
2006). This also raises great concern for study on China, because unlike Russia and other
former Soviet Union countries, China carried out its rm privatization through a mild and
long process.
In order to solve above problems, I use data for listed companies in China and identify the
ownership according to its type of ultimately controlling group reported in the annual report.
This identication is in line with most literature on nancial market and listed companies
under transition. I have collected panel data for 226 listed companies that transited from
SOEs to private companies during 2000-2010, covering over 100 cities and 21industires. More
details about my data are provided in Section V.
2.4 Theoretical Model
This section provides a formal setting for my empirical work. Suppose that, in the economy,
there are an innite number of rms, each classied as privately owned enterprises or state
owned enterprises (SOEs). The product function of each rm is assumed to be
F (K;L)
whereK and L denote the amounts of capital and labor devoted to production, respectively.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the private enterprises and the SOEs produce identical
products, and the price of their products is normalized to 1. Therefore, the revenue of each
rm is also measured by F (K;L).
As a standard setting in literatures, the following assumption on F (K;L) is made here.
Assumption 2.1 F (K;L) is increasing and concave in K and L, i.e., F 0K (K;L) > 0 and
F "KK (K;L) < 0; F
0
L (K;L) and F
"
LL (K;L) < 0.
For a private rm, the optimal choice of K and L is that maximizes its prot1,
P = F
 
KP ; LP
  rKP   wLP
1 In my model, the superscript "P" and "S" denote functional forms and variables for privately owned rms
and SOEs, respectively.
45
where r denotes the rental cost of capital and w is the wage rate. Both capital market and
labor market are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Hence, the private rms and the SOEs
face the same r and w.
One major di¤erence between the private rms and the SOEs is that the SOEs care about
employment in addition to the prot. This feature of the SOEs is documented by many
researchers and considered as the critical cause of ine¢ ciency in the SOEs (see e.g. Boycko
et al., 1996; Bai et al., 2000). The government requires the SOEs to have large amounts of
surplus workers to maintain social stability or seek political supports from the people. Bai et
al. (2000) argue that the manager of an SOE performs multiple tasks, increasing the revenue
of the rm and raise the revenue of all rms in the economy. Increasing employment helps to
maintain social stability and has a positive e¤ect on all the rms.
Therefore, an SOE aims at maximizing the following object function
S = F
 
KS ; LS
  rKS   wLS + q  LS
where q(L) measures the utility caused by keeping workers in the rms. The following
assumption on the q(L) is necessary.
Assumption 2.2 q(L) is increasing in L, and is always smaller than the total cost of labor,
i.e., 0 < q0 (L) < w.
Here, q0 (L) is assumed to be smaller than the wage rate. Otherwise, an SOE can obtain
higher utility simply by innitely increasing the number of workers, which contradicts with
the reality. Mathematically, form the rst order condition, I have F 0L
 
KS ; LS
 w + q0  LS,
where F 0L
 
KS ; LS

> 0. So, q0
 
LS
  w < 0.
The following propositions illustrate the main arguments of this paper.
Proposition 2.1 The privately owned rms have higher protability than the SOEs.
Proof. The proof to Proposition 1 is very straightforward. A private rm maximizes its prot,
while an SOE maximizes a total utility composed of prot and q(L). The private rm chooses
K and L according to prot maximization, which yield higher prot than that obtained by the
SOE. When q(L) = 0, they archive the same protability.
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This result is consistent with many empirical nding in previous studies (see, e.g. Chen et
al., 2006). Di¤erent types of dominant owner have di¤erent objectives in running rms. The-
oretically, with other conditions assumed to be identical, a rm aiming at prot maximization
yields higher prot than that having di¤erent objective, because their choices of input variables
are optimal for maximizing the value of objective functions.
Proposition 2.2 When KP = KS, the marginal productivity of labor in private rms is
higher than that in the SOEs.
Proof. For an SOE, the rst order condition infers that F 0L
 
K;LS
   w + q0  LS = 0.
For a private rm, the optimal condition is F 0L
 
K;LP
   w = 0.Therefore, F 0L  K;LS =
w   q0  LS < w = F 0L  K;LP . Hence, the SOE has lower marginal labor productivity.
Proposition 2.3 When KP = KS, LP < LS.
Proof. Following the proof to Proposition 2, I have F 0L
 
K;LS

< F 0L
 
K;LP

. According to
Assumption 1, F "LL (K;L) < 0, meaning F
0
L (K;L) is decreasing in L. Therefore, L
S > LP .
Proposition 2 and 3 explain why SOEs tend to have lower marginal labor productivity
and more employees, among whom some are redundant. Considering the typical inversed U-
shaped curve for marginal labor productivity and U-shaped curve for cost of labor input, one
could intuitively explain this phenomenon by pinning the SOEs at the right parts of both
curves, i.e., where the marginal labor productivity decreases with number of workers while
cost of labor increases. When capital input is xed, an excess of labor input yields lower
marginal labor productivity and higher cost, and further causes reductions in e¢ ciency and
protability. When an SOE is privatized, it switches its objective of operation from maintaining
social stability to maximizing prot and has to cut the number employees in the purpose of
improving productivity and reducing cost of production.
2.5 The Data
The data used in this paper comes from three main sources, none of which has been widely
applied to studies on Chinese privatization. Both nancial data and corporate governance
measures are primarily obtained from the PACAP-CCER Greater China Database created
and maintained by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacic-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Research
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Center at University of Rhode Island and the China Center for Economic Research (CCER)
at Peking University. This up-to-date database covers information of 2856 listed companies
in China for 1991-2011 and some major macroeconomic statistics for 1978-2011. One should
note that the availabilities of di¤erent variables vary a lot depending on when these items were
required to be disclosed by the listed companies for the rst time. For instant, the disclosure of
total cash compensation of the three top-paid executives (COMP_MG3) has been mandated
since 1998, while records for type of ultimately controlling group (CGTYPE) started even
later.
One limitation of the PACAP-CCER database is that accounting data for companies are
mainly constructed based on the summaries of the annual reports, with many detailed in-
formation omitted. Hence, I supplement this database with the China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technol-
ogy Company. The CSMAR database contains accounting and nancial information of 2,408
Chinese listed companies for 1991-2011. Similar to the PACAP-CCER database, the CSMAR
database contains more complete data for recent years than that for the twentieth century.
The pivotal information of this study is the rm-level employment information, such as
number of current workers, coming from data that I collected from the Annual Reports dis-
closed by the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).
Combining di¤erent data sources is less likely to cause inconsistency here because all the listed
companies can be identied by unique stock market IDs (STKID) or company IDs (COID)
assigned by the exchanges. Matching companies from several databases is largely straightfor-
ward as long as either STKID or COID or both are contained in the databases. This property
gives usage of listed company data a great advantage in the aspect of data collecting and
provides possibility to enlarge the sample set to a substantial extent.2
2My database can be potentially extended to all the Chinese listed companies (with and without ownership
transition) in the sense that data for employment can be actually obtained from the Annual Reports of each
company and other information is already ready for use. It is also possible to obtain data for a larger time span,
such as 1998-2011. Mandatory disclosure sources for Annual Reports include the China Securities Journal,
the Shanghai Securities News, the Securities Times, as well as websites of the Shanghai Securities Exchange
(http://www.sse.com.cn) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (http://www.szse.cn). The present Shanghai Se-
curities Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were founded at the end of 1990, meaning modern listed
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The earliest Annual Reports can be found online are dated in 2001, although it is possi-
ble to obtain older reports from the newspaper/website archives and the historical records of
the SSE and the SZSE. Therefore, I use data on type of ultimately controlling group (from
the PACAP-CCER database) in 2000 to identify if a privately-owned company in 2001 was
under ownership transition in the previous year, but my analysis on e¤ects of transition only
based on data for the period 2001-2010. That is, for the six companies which switched their
ownership from state-owned to privately-owned in 2000, ten years of post privatization data is
used. I dene the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as companies ultimately controlled by gov-
ernment agencies or all the local residents or all the employees in the companies, including the
state-owned, collectively-owned, social organization-owned and employee-owned companies. I
consider both companies privately-owned by domestic capital and the foreign capital-owned
companies as privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Above six classications cover all the types
of ultimately controlling group in my data. My denition of the SOE exceeds the range of
companies controlled by the government, which is usually considered as the single type of the
SOE in the literature. Although companies nominally controlled by government, collectives,
social organizations, and employees are not exactly the same in some aspects, such as adminis-
trative priority and structure, they have been operated somehow the same way in practice and
going through very similar privatization process. Hence, it is reasonable to include all these
companies to study the impact of privatization on the SOEs.
Considering the availabilities of all the variables of interest in this study as well as Chinese
privatization process, I choose 226 listed companies under ownership transition during 2000-
2010. Here, I exclude nancial companies, such as insurance companies and banks, which is
in line with most of the literature. For all the 226 companies, I collect data on prots, sales,
total assets, total xed assets, total wages paid to workers, number of workers, total cash
companies have been documented since 1991. Online sources provide Annual Reports dated as early as 2001,
while more historical records could be found from the archives of major disclosure sources. Also, there are
online forums o¤ering early Annual Reports uploaded by users. Obtaining Annual Reports for each company
for each year and collecting information of interest from them could be very time-consuming. I am currently
including 226 listed companies under transition during 2000-2010. One possible step to extend the database is
supplementing it with data for 1998-2000 and 2011 to cover all the companies privatized since 1998.
49
compensation of the three top-paid executives, total cash compensation paid to executives,
number of executives, type of ultimately controlling group. All the accounting items are
deated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the State Statistical Bureau.
The nal database is composed of 10-years panel data for 226 listed companies in China
from 2001 to 2010, with 2,260 observations in total. This database is quite unique for studies
on privatization in China, because most of the previous research uses survey data, covering
companies in certain regions or industries only. For example, Hu, et al. (2004) base their
sample set on a World Bank survey of Chinese enterprises for 1996-2001, conducted in ve
cities and seven sectors.3 Tlusty-Sheen (2001) collects data from a manufacture survey on
mining and manufacturing rms in three provinces for 1995-1999.4 The same data is also
used by Bhaumik and Estrin (2007). Li and Rozelle (2001) conduct surveys on 168 rural
manufacturing enterprises in two provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) in 1997 and early 1998.
My observations come from a set of companies, not limited to certain geographical areas or
industries. More specically, my database covers companies in more than 100 random cities
and 21 industries such as utilities, telecommunication services, health care equipment and
services, chemicals, and electrical equipment. One might question the representativeness of
the listed companies, because the requirements of being listed on the exchanges are somewhat
of a selection.5 Since statistics for all the Chinese enterprises is not currently available and
less feasible to conduct, it is ambiguous to conclude if the average rm size of my sample is
larger than that of all the rms in China in a great scale. Compared with some sample sets
in literature, my data do contain relatively more large companies. However, studies focus on
3This survey covers 736 rms in Beijing, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Wuhan. The rms are
from seven sectors: electronic equipment, electronic components, consumer products, vehicles and vehicle parts,
garments and leather goods, general machinery and textile. As mentioned in Hu, et al. (2004), the distribution
of surveyed rms across sectors is slightly imbalanced: the vehicle and vehicle parts sector has been well-
presented while the textile sector is likely to be under-presented.
4The sample used by Sheen (2001) only includes 138 Chinese manufacturing rms in Shaanxi, Hunan,
and Shanxi provinces, belonging to mining and manufacturing industries: mining, light industries, engineering
products, chemicals and utilities.
5Listing on the SSE requires: the companys total share capital must not be less than 50,000,000 yuan.
Listing on the Main Board and SME Board of the SZSE requires: the total share capital before the o¤er shall
not be less than 3,000,000 yuan. Listing on the ChiNext of the SZSE requires: it must have a total share capital
of no less than 30,000,000 yuan after the IPO, and it must have net assets of no less than 20,000,000 yuan. For
more details, please see http://www.sse.com.cn and http://www.szse.cn.
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various aspects of Chinese privatization, and data selection could be di¤erent in regard to the
facts of interests. For example, Li and Rozelle (2001) use a sample of rural enterprises to
study the buyout price and performance of privatized rms in rural China, and their sample
obviously includes a mass of small rms.6 A summary statistics of the 226 listed companies is
provided in Table 2.1.
2.6 Empirical Strategy
2.6.1 Regression Models and DID Method
In this paper, a simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) approach is used to estimate changes
in number of workers, average wage, protability, productivity, per capita assets and sales
associated with ownership privatization. To be more specic, I estimate the following equation
for rm i in year t:
yit = + 0Ownershipit + 1i + 2t + "it (2.1)
where y is the outcome of interest (e.g. employment, wage, prot, per capita sales) for
rm i in year t; Ownership is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the rm is privately
owned; i and t capture rm and year xed e¤ects. Here, I am interested in the parameter
0. As discussed in previous literatures, only the timing of privatization is assumed to be
exogenous. Therefore, the parameter 0 only captures the structural breaks in the outcome
of interest associated with the timing of privatization, excluding the xed di¤erences across
rms or years.
I also consider two more complicated specications as follows,
yit = + 0Ownershipit + 1i + 2t + 3 (i  t) + "it (2.2)
yit = + 0Ownershipit + 1i + 2t + 3 (i  t) + "it (2.3)
In addition to settings in Equation (2.1), Equation (2.2) includes a term, i  t, to repre-
sent the rm-specic linear time trends, capturing rm-specic di¤erences that vary linearly
6Li and Rozelle (2001) require that the sampled enterprise should have at least twenty employees and a
xed capital base that exceeded 200,000 yuan.
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over time. As discussed above, this linear rm-year xed di¤erence is also purged from the
parameter 0. Equation (2.3) include the industry-year xed e¤ect, i  t, where i is the
industry-specic xed di¤erence. Estimation results for Equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) are
provided in Table 2.2.
In order to show the changes in dependent variables during transition, I obtain residual
means shown relative to the year of privatization in each rm by estimating Equation (2.1)
without the ownership dummy variable. Results are plotted in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
2.6.2 Method to Calculate Return to Scale
In order to test my hypothesis that privatization induces a decrease in employment, I examine
whether and how the capital-labor substitution and return to scale change with respect to the
ownership transition. First, I assume that the production function of rms is in the following
Cobb Douglas form
Y (L;K) = ALK
where Y is the total production; L is the labor input; K is the capital input; A represents
the total factor productivity (TFP);  and  denote the output elasticities of labor and capital,
respectively. Here, I aim at examining the changes in , , and + during transition. Taking
the natural log of both sides of the Cobb Douglas production function, I obtain ln (Y ) =
ln (A) +  ln (L) +  ln (K).
Hence, I consider an OLS regression model as follows.
yit = ln (A) + lit + kit + "it (2.4)
where y, l, and k represent the total production, the labor input, and the capital input
for rm i in year t, and they are all in the logarithmic form. In order to compare variations
between di¤erent ownership structures, I rst estimate Equation (2.4) for SOEs and privately
owned rms separately, and compare the estimates for di¤erent types of rms. Results are
presented in Table 2.3. Then, I run this regression by pooling the data according to year
before/after privatization, in the purpose of examining changes in return to scale as well as
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the output elasticities of labor and capital relative to the timing of privatization. Table 2.4
shows the regression results with respect to years before/after ownership change.
Due to the limited availability of data, I use total sales to approximate total production.
This approximation might cause bias in estimation, because the ratio between sales and pro-
duction varies among rms. In order to modify this representation to the largest extent, I
include regional dummy and/or industrial dummy in the following regressions as a robustness
check.
yit = ln (A) + lit + kit + 1Industryit + "it (2.5)
yit = ln (A) + lit + kit + 2Eastit + 3Westit+"it (2.6)
yit = ln (A) + lit + kit + 1Industryit + 2Eastit + 3Westit+"it (2.7)
Here, East and West are regional dummies, indicating whether the headquarters of a rm
is located in the east or west part of China7. Estimation results for Equation (2.5), (2.6), and
(2.7) are shown in Panel A, B, and C of Table 2.5, respectively.
2.7 Empirical Results
My hypotheses on privatization infer that the SOEs tend to have higher labor-capital ratio and
lower protability before transition. The regression models allow me to test my hypotheses and
study why (or why not) employment and rm performance change with ownership transition.
2.7.1 Ownership and Employment
I investigate changes in the number of workers and average wage related to the timing of priva-
tization, using residual employment measures obtained by estimating Equation (2.1) without
the ownership dummy variable. Figure 2.1 plots the residual means for the eight years pre-
ceding and following privatization. Here, the year that each rm is switched from SOE to
7Chinese cities are divided into three regions according to geographical locations and economy conditions.
The east part of China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shan-
dong, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Chongqing, Dalian, Ningbo, Xiamen, Qingdao, Shenzhen. The central
part covers Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan. The west part
includes Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
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privately owned rm is dened as year 0, i.e., ownership change occurs during the time period
from year -1 to year 0. According to Figure 2.1, there are no signicant changes in number of
workers prior to privatization, while sharp declines occur right after the change of ownership.
This nding is consistent with the predications of my theoretical model, i.e., the employment
level will be dramatically cut after privatization. Figure 2.1 also shows no signicant change
in average wage before privatization, followed by a decrease that coincides with the change of
ownership. Similar results can be obtained by estimating Equation (2.2) without the ownership
dummy.
Furthermore, I examine the impact of privatization by estimating Equation (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.3), using number of workers and average wage as dependent variables. One should
note that all the variables used in the regression models are in logarithmic form. So, the
estimates indicate the percent changes in dependent variables. As shown in Panel A of Table
2.2, privatization is associated with a 24% decrease in number of workers and roughly a 5%
decrease in average wage. According to the Governments Work report given by Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao in 2005, the total numbers of laid-o¤ workers from SOEs were 6,000,000,
4,100,000, 2,600,000, and 1,530,000 in the previous four years, respectively, among which
many were from rms under privatization. Here, the reduction in average wage is not statistic
signicant, which might be explained by the fact that low-skilled workers compose a majority
of the rising unemployment. On the one hand, reform imposes a cut in the wages and a threat
of being laid o¤ in general, but on the other hand, employees who stay in the rm originally
had higher wages than those dismissed. Therefore, the e¤ect of privatization on the change in
wages is mixed, and I do not expect a sharp decline in average wage.
2.7.2 Ownership and Firm Performance
Protability
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents regression results of Equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) to show
changes in rm performance before and after privatization. The dependent variables are Prot,
Sales, Assets, and return to assets (ROA).All the variables, except ROA, are in logarithmic
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form and deated by the CPI. According to Table 2.2, no signicant change in prot is found,
while sales and assets exhibit sharp reductions after privatization. The shrink of sales and
assets, along with the reduced employment, indicate reduction of enterprise scale. This down-
sizing does not a¤ect rmsprot to a large extent, somehow indicating an improvement in
protability after privatization. Also, ROA (i.e., prot divided by total assets) is increased
after ownership transition, conrming that privatization spurs protability of rms.
To further examine the shrink of rm size and increase in e¢ ciency, I estimate Equation
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) using sales and assets rescaled by number of workers. The regression
results are shown in Panel C of Table 2.2. For Equation (2.1), the per capita assets are
increased after ownership transition, which means the total assets of rms do not shrink as
much as employment. Selling out part of the assets of SOEs is a common component of the
reform, but lying o¤workers is more directly used to get rid of burdens and reduce costs. Hence,
reduction in employment plays a more important role in privatization in China. As expected,
the per capita sales are signicantly increased after privatization, which might partly be caused
by the improvement in marginal labor productivity. As discussed previously, the SOEs tend
to have redundant labor input, which has low marginal productivity and high marginal cost.
Dismissing these redundant workers can contribute to increases in per capita production and
sales. These nding further conrm my theoretical hypotheses on privatization.
Residual means of prot, sales and ROA relative to the year of privatization in each rm
are shown in Figure 2.2. Again, the residual means are obtained by estimating Equation
(2.1) without the ownership dummy variable. A downward trend in annual prot is observed
before privatization, and the decline continues in the rst year after privatization, followed by
increases in prot which compose an upward trend for later years after privatization. According
to my hypotheses, improvements in protability are expected to occur after the switch of
ownership. However, the ownership transition takes time to be nalized and market usually
responds to changes in rm policies and operation with lag. For instant, an improvement in
labor productivity might immediately increase the total production, but its impacts on market
share and revenue take place much later. Very similarly, the residual means of sales and ROA
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compose U-shaped curves with the lowest points occurring in the rst year after privatization.
Calculating corresponding residual means form Equation (2.2) and (2.3) yields similar results.
Return to Scale
Table 2.3 presents the regression results for Equation (2.4) with SOEs and privately-owned
rms estimated separately. The output elasticity of capital does not vary signicantly among
di¤erent types of rms, while the output elasticity of labor for privately owned rms is higher
than that for SOEs. I also test the null hypotheses that the sum of  and  equals one to
check the return to scale. For the SOEs, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected, i.e., the sum
is not signicantly di¤erent from one, indicating a constant return to scale. For the privately
owned rms, the null hypothesis is rejected, presenting properties of increasing return to scale.
In this sense, privatization could yields improvement in e¢ ciency and protability.
In order to investigate the changes in return to scale as well as the output elasticities of
labor and capital, I estimate Equation (2.4) by pooling the data according to time relative
to privatization. The regression results for six years before and after privatization are shown
in Table 2.3. Specically, for "Year = 1", the estimates are obtained by regressing Equation
(2.4) for all the data dated in one year after privatization. As seen in Table 2.4, the output
elasticities of labor and capital vary over years and the sum of  and , which somehow
expresses the return to scale, exhibits an increasing trend. This upward trend in return to
scale is mainly caused by the rising output elasticity of labor. This nding further conrms
my argument that the marginal labor productivity increases after privatization. To present
this upward trend more clearly, I plot the sum of  and  in Figure 2.3.
As a robustness check, regression results for Equation (2.5)-(2.7) are presented in Table
2.5. Similarly to the results shown in Table 2.4, an increasing trend in the sum of the output
elasticity of labor and the output elasticity of capital is found, no matter whether I include
industrial dummies and/or regional dummies in the regression model. Here, my industrial
dummies cover nine industries, such as energy, material, consumer discretionary, health care,
information technology, and utilities. The regional dummies indicate whether the headquarters
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of each rm is located in the east or west of China. The identication of regions complies with
the o¢ cial classication, based on geographical position and annual GDP. In the nal sample,
I have 1,482 observations for the east area and 347 observations for the west.
2.7.3 Robustness
I examine the robustness of the above empirical work by substitute ownership dummy by the
percentage of shares held by the private sector, and compare the results with the previous
ones in Table 2.6. By considering the percentage of non-SOE shares, which is a more precise
measurement of ownership type. I am able to further check the impacts of privatization on
employment and rm performance. As shown in Table 2.6, estimates obtained from Equation
(2.1) using percentage of non-SOE shares, instead of ownership dummy, are generally consistent
with the estimates in Table 2.2. To be specic, the number of workers decreases with the
percentage of shares held by the private sector signicantly, while the change in average wage
is ambiguous; signicant improvements in ROA and other rm performance measurements are
also observed. This further conrms the statistical robustness of my empirical results8.
2.7.4 Discussion
My results show that the employment falls dramatically after privatization while change in av-
erage wage is ambiguous. I suspect that the laid-o¤s during transition are mainly low-skilled
workers, whose wage were originally lower than others. This argument can be examined by
checking information of employees in each rm, but the detailed employment information is
generally not disclosed by rms. Therefore, a possible but more challenging way to investigate
change in employment is collecting residents information from the population census con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. There is only summarized statistics of
employment information in the published China Statistical Yearbook, while the questionnaires
contain questions on personal employment information with details. Questionnaires for early
years have been disclosed for a fee gradually, and it is possible to track an individual cross
8A more detailed analysis of the relationship between employment and percentage of shares held by the
private sector using semi-parametric estimation is included in my other work.
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years by his/her gender, date of birth, birth place, residence, etc. Although it is less feasible
to manually match a huge amount of respondents in census for many years, one would still be
able to study employment status for specic years, e.g. 2 years before and after rm he/she
worked for was privatized.
Also, many interesting issues related to privatization in China can be investigated through
individual data. For instant, if some respondents reported employed by the SOEs in the
previous census while became unemployed later, it would be straightforward to think whether
the new unemployment was mainly caused by privatization, and what characteristics those laid-
o¤ workers shared, e.g. checking if they are low-educated, low-skilled, or female. Furthermore,
if sequential information is available, examining the re-employment of the laid-o¤s is possible,
e.g. tracking if they are absorbed by the private sector or public sector or staying unemployed
ever after. If the laid-o¤s stay unemployed, issues with regard to social security, income
gap, and crime rate are potentially raised. There are studies on the re-employment of laid-
o¤ workers in some particular regions in China, such as Beijing (see, e.g. Ma et al. 2008),
but national-wide analysis is rarely seen and further investigation is needed to examine the
relationship between re-employment and privatization.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper argues that the privatization of Chinese SOEs is a major spur to increased e¢ -
ciency and protability, and lead to a reduction in employment as well. The tradeo¤ between
maintaining employment and improving rm performance is unavoidable during privatization,
because the SOEs tend to have redundant workers, whose marginal productivity is low. As
discussed in my theoretical model, the SOEs are associated with ine¢ ciency by nature, due
to the fact that they are operated by the government in the purpose of social welfare provi-
sion. The theoretical hypotheses are consistent with my empirical ndings, which show a 24%
decrease in number of workers and a 2% increase in return to assets after privatization. In
order to rule out the possibility that reduction in employment is mainly caused by shrink in
rm size instead of conversion in rm objectives, I examine the changes in total assets and
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sales with both divided by number of workers. I nd that the rescaled total assets and sales
are increased by 9.7% and 7% after ownership transition, indicating that employment is cut
to a larger extent during privatization and there is signicant gain in e¢ ciency. Reduction
in average wage is ambiguous, because the laid-o¤s during transition are mainly low-skilled
workers, whose wage were originally lower than others, and the impact of privatization on wage
rates for employees is mixed.
In order to further investigate the cause of gains in e¢ ciency and protability, I study the
changes in return to scale as well as the output elasticities of labor and capital. My empirical
results show that the SOEs and the privately owned rms di¤er in the output elasticities of
labor while their output elasticities of capital are quite similar, and the privatization of SOEs is
associated with increasing return to scale. Since my regression model is based on time relative
to privatization, I can capture the time trend for each variable of interest. Upward trends in
output elasticity of labor as well as in return to scale are observed, indicating an improvement
in protability induced by the increased labor productivity after privatization. These results
are robust to specication settings with industrial dummies and/or regional dummies, and
again conrm that cut in employment during privatization yields higher marginal productivity
of labor and protability.
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2.9 Appendix
Figure 21: Employment and privatization timing
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Figure 22: Firm performance and privatization timing
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Figure 23: Change in return to scale
62
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Year Number of Workers ln(avg. wage) ln(prot) ln(sales) ln(assets)
-6 3082.076 5.792 13.19 16.017 16.584
-5 2852.264 5.781 13.094 15.978 16.544
-4 2744.307 5.908 13.13 15.988 16.541
-3 3008.688 5.87 13.282 15.962 16.53
-2 3068.995 5.85 13.034 15.792 16.441
-1 3152.601 5.952 13.179 15.768 16.402
0 3274.203 5.995 13.159 15.84 16.48
1 2166.094 5.771 12.9 15.467 16.186
2 1863.577 5.763 12.889 15.431 16.121
3 2077.168 5.904 13.151 15.677 16.245
4 2124.89 6.021 13.116 15.714 16.361
5 2254.579 6.067 13.426 15.786 16.431
6 2474.15 6.102 13.262 15.861 16.457
Note: Data are summarized relative to timing of privatization. That is, "Year = -6"
indicates 6 years before privatization; "Year = 6" means 6 years after privatization, and so on.
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Table 2.2: Changes in employment and rm performance from before priva-
tization to after privatization
Dependent variable 0 for Eq. (1) 0 for Eq. (2) 0 for Eq. (3)
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Panel A
ln(number of workers) -0.242* -0.044 -0.234*
(0.050) (0.038) (0.049)
ln(avg. wage) -0.05 -0.093* -0.055
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Panel B
ln(prot) -0.024 0.022 -0.007
(0.078) (0.072) (0.077)
ln(sales) -0.213* -0.069 -0.200*
(0.052) (0.038) (0.051)
ln(assets) -0.137* -0.074* -0.125*
(0.037) (0.024) (0.036)
ROA 0.020* 0.020* 0.020*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Panel C
ln(prot)/ln(number of workers) 0.176* 0.032 0.181*
(0.086) (0.080) (0.085)
ln(sales)/ln(number of workers) 0.070* -0.026 0.042
(0.020) (0.042) (0.049)
ln(total assets)/ln(number of workers) 0.097* -0.033 0.101*
(0.026) (0.036) (0.044)
Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses, clustered by rm) shown for the
ownership dummy variable obtained by estimating Equation (1), (2) and (3). In Equation
(1), I control for the rm xed e¤ect and the year xed e¤ect, while in Equation (2), the rm
xed e¤ect, the year xed e¤ect, as well as the rm-specic linear time trend are controlled.
In Equation (3), I control for the rm xed e¤ect, the year xed e¤ect, and the industry-year
xed e¤ect. * p<0.05.
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Table 2.3: Output elasticities of labor and capital for the SOEs and privately
owned rms
State Owned Firms Privately Owned Firms
 0.265* 0.314*
(0.025) (0.029)
 0.768* 0.798*
(0.029) (0.032)
+  1.033 1.112
Test Yes No
N 1137 869
R2 0.5326 0.6102
Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses, clustered by rm) shown for the
output elasticity of labor and the output elasticity of capital obtained by estimating Equation
(3) for the SOEs and privately owned rms separately. * p<0.05.
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Table 2.4: Changes in output elasticities of labor and capital from before
privatization to after privatization
Year  for Eq. (3)  for Eq. (3) +  N R2
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
-6 0.205* 0.827* 1.032* 104 0.5433
(0.080) (0.097) (0.126)
-5 0.194* 0.759* 0.953* 123 0.4919
(0.073) (0.092) (0.117)
-4 0.204* 0.697* 0.901* 137 0.4351
(0.078) (0.091) (0.120)
-3 0.261* 0.823* 1.084* 154 0.569
(0.065) (0.078) (0.102)
-2 0.319* 0.844* 1.163* 177 0.6105
(0.066) (0.069) (0.095)
-1 0.251* 0.835* 1.086* 199 0.6204
(0.062) (0.068) (0.092)
0 0.365* 0.722* 1.087* 199 0.6094
(0.066) (0.068) (0.095)
1 0.312* 0.800* 1.112* 132 0.5528
(0.077) (0.091) (0.119)
2 0.436* 0.703* 1.139* 118 0.5379
(0.077) (0.097) (0.124)
3 0.334* 0.654* 0.988* 111 0.4824
(0.086) (0.099) (0.131)
4 0.200* 0.898* 1.098* 96 0.6537
(0.080) (0.099) (0.127)
5 0.281* 0.969* 1.250* 76 0.721
(0.093) (0.100) (0.137)
6 0.220* 1.035* 1.255* 62 0.7278
(0.097) (0.113) (0.149)
Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses, clustered by rm) shown for the
output elasticity of labor and the output elasticity of capital obtained by estimating Equation
(3). "Year = -6" indicates 6 years before privatization; "Year = 6" means 6 years after
privatization, and so on. * p<0.05.
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Table 2.5: Changes in output elasticities of labor and capital from before
privatization to after privatization (with industrial and/or regional dummies)
Year   +    +    + 
(4) (4) (4) (5) (5) (5) (6) (6) (6)
-6 0.189* 0.848* 1.037* 0.283* 0.715* 0.998* 0.271* 0.710* 0.981*
(0.088) (0.105) (0.137) (0.075) (0.093) (0.119) (0.083) (0.102) (0.132)
-5 0.218* 0.760* 0.978* 0.229* 0.695* 0.924* 0.252* 0.680* 0.932*
(0.079) (0.096) (0.124) (0.070) (0.089) (0.113) (0.076) (0.094) (0.121)
-4 0.203* 0.698* 0.901* 0.217* 0.678* 0.895* 0.206* 0.672* 0.878*
(0.082) (0.094) (0.125) (0.075) (0.088) (0.116) (0.078) (0.090) (0.119)
-3 0.257* 0.862* 1.119* 0.285* 0.774* 1.059* 0.268* 0.814* 1.082*
(0.067) (0.079) (0.104) (0.064) (0.077) (0.100) (0.065) (0.077) (0.101)
-2 0.316* 0.860* 1.176* 0.331* 0.819* 1.150* 0.313* 0.841* 1.154*
(0.070) (0.070) (0.099) (0.064) (0.067) (0.093) (0.067) (0.067) (0.095)
-1 0.243* 0.856* 1.099* 0.271* 0.807* 1.078* 0.259* 0.825* 1.084*
(0.066) (0.071) (0.097) (0.061) (0.069) (0.092) (0.064) (0.071) (0.096)
0 0.325* 0.734* 1.059* 0.396* 0.688* 1.084* 0.354* 0.697* 1.051*
(0.072) (0.071) (0.101) (0.066) (0.069) (0.095) (0.071) (0.071) (0.100)
1 0.278* 0.834* 1.112* 0.326* 0.778* 1.104* 0.291* 0.810* 1.101*
(0.081) (0.095) (0.125) (0.078) (0.095) (0.123) (0.081) (0.098) (0.127)
2 0.400* 0.753* 1.153* 0.452* 0.680* 1.132* 0.410* 0.729* 1.139*
(0.082) (0.102) (0.131) (0.078) (0.100) (0.127) (0.081) (0.103) (0.131)
3 0.306* 0.693* 0.999* 0.338* 0.647* 0.985* 0.306* 0.683* 0.989*
(0.090) (0.106) (0.139) (0.086) (0.101) (0.133) (0.089) (0.106) (0.138)
4 0.174 0.983* 1.157* 0.193* 0.902* 1.095* 0.173 0.972* 1.145*
(0.089) (0.111) (0.142) (0.082) (0.103) (0.132) (0.090) (0.114) (0.145)
5 0.202 1.076* 1.278* 0.277* 0.975* 1.252* 0.202 1.082* 1.284*
(0.102) (0.111) (0.151) (0.095) (0.103) (0.140) (0.103) (0.115) (0.154)
6 0.216* 1.019* 1.235* 0.208* 1.054* 1.262* 0.216* 1.032* 1.248*
(0.105) (0.123) (0.162) (0.098) (0.116) (0.152) (0.105) (0.126) (0.164)
Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses, clustered by rm) shown for the
output elasticity of labor and the output elasticity of capital obtained by estimating Equa-
tion (4)-(6). Numbers in the parentheses below , , and  + , indicate which equation is
estimated. In Equation (4), I control for industrial xed e¤ect. In Equation (5), I control for
regional xed e¤ect. In Equation (6), I control for both industrial xed e¤ect and regional
xed e¤ects. * p<0.05.
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Table 2.6: Changes in employment and rm performance
Dependent variable 0(Ownership Dummy) 0(% Private Shares)
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Panel A
ln(number of workers) -0.242* -0.664*
(0.050) (0.100)
ln(avg. wage) -0.05 -0.036
(0.040) (0.052)
Panel B
ln(prot) -0.024 0.275
(0.078) (0.159)
ln(sales) -0.213* -0.206
(0.052) (0.106)
ln(assets) -0.137* -0.182*
(0.037) (0.074)
ROA 0.020* 0.068*
(0.008) (0.016)
Panel C
ln(prot)/ln(number of workers) 0.176* 0.932*
(0.086) (0.175)
ln(sales)/ln(number of workers) 0.070* 0.455*
(0.020) (0.101)
ln(total assets)/ln(number of workers) 0.097* 0.478*
(0.026) (0.089)
Note: Estimates and standard errors (in parentheses, clustered by rm) are obtained by
estimating Equation (1) using ownership dummy and percentage of shares held by the private
sector, respectively. In Equation (1), I control for rm xed e¤ect and year xed e¤ect. *
p<0.05.
Chapter 3
ExecutivesWealth, Firm Size and Risk
Management for Financial Institutions
3.1 Introduction
Risk management in nancial institutions has gained great attention especially since the 2007-
2008 Global Financial Crisis. Among all the issues considered to be relevant to (failures of)
risk management, executives compensation and rm size are generally the most important
two. There is an abundant literature on the relationship between executivescompensation,
rm size and risk-taking. However, almost all the previous studies are based on data for
the U.S. or the European countries. Since China has a bunch of characteristics which make
it quite di¤erent from "the Western World", it is straightforward to suspect that Chinese
nancial institutions have their unique response to risk, even during the Global Financial
Crisis. Unfortunately, information required by studies on this topic is much less abundant
in China than in the developed western countries, which makes the empirical research on
similar issues using Chinese data very rarely seen. To my knowledge, this paper is the rst
one to analyze links between executiveswealth, rm size and risk-taking behavior for rms in
mainland China.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between rm size, executiveswealth, and rm
risk-taking, using data for Chinese listed rms, and analyze the changes in executivesbehavior
during the Global Financial Crisis. Here, I use "wealth", instead of "compensation", to mea-
sure executivesmonetary incentive to manage rms, because my data contain information
about cash compensation granted by rms and percentage of rm stock held by executives
including both rm issued stock options and stock traded on the market. That is, I cannot
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distinguish whether and how much of the executivesrm stock holding is through compensa-
tion by the rms. To make my study more precise, I treat the executivescash compensation
and stock holding separately. This characteristic is caused by the reporting system of Chinese
rms that is slightly di¤erent from those adopted in the U.S. and European countries.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. Section II briey reviews
some of the previous studies, emphasizing literature on the causalities between executives
compensation, rm size and risk-taking. Section III presents the data utilized in this paper
and also discusses advantages and possible improvement of my data. Section IV provides an
empirical framework to examine the above causalities, followed by the corresponding empirical
results and discussion in Section V. Concluding remarks are presented in section VI.
3.2 Previous Studies
3.2.1 Firm Size and Risk-Taking
Large rm size is commonly linked to excessive risk-taking and considered as crucial causes of
severe disruption to the economy, for example, the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis. There
is a abundant literature on the causality between rms size and the risk level, supporting the
idea that rms would like to take extra risk in the short run if they are perceived to be "too big
to fail" (see, e.g. Bhagat, 2012). Studies on nancial institutions suggest that giant nancial
institutions, such as commercial banks, investment banks, are more likely to be bailed out by
governments in order to avoid disturbance in the economy, which impose the risk on the whole
society instead of only the nancial institutions.
Supporters of this view are numerous. For instant, Boyd and Runkle (1993) nd that
higher rm risk is associated with larger rm size, when using z-score, the standard deviation
of the ROA (return on assets), and the equity to assets ratio as measurements of rms risk
level. Very similar results are obtained by De Nicolo (2000) and Laeven and Levine (2009),
using the same measurements of risk. Stiroh (2006) considres using the standard deviation
of weekly stock return to indicate rms risk level and also nd that an increase in rm size
induces more risk for the rm.
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3.2.2 Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking
Previous studies on executives compensation commonly distinguish cash compensation (or
called non-equity-based compensation) and equity-based compensation, which are two pri-
mary components of executivescompensation. The two types of compensation provide the
executives with di¤erent incentives when they make decisions for the rm. Therefore, ex-
ecutivescompensation structure is generally considered as one important issue for the risk
management of the rm. It has been shown that executives with higher equity-based com-
pensation tend to make risk-taking decisions to seek higher returns, while cash compensation
does not signicantly induce such behavior.
There are lots of studies on this issue. For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) nd that
excessive equity-based compensation is correlated with the excessive risk-taking. Sundaram
and Yermack (2007), using the standard deviation of rm value to measure rm risk, argue
that there is lower risk if executivespension increases relatively to their stocking holdings.
3.2.3 Firm Size and Executive Compensation
Executives compensation has been raised dramatically since the mid-1980s, which largely
spurs the research on the determinant of executivescompensation. There are several theories
of the determinants of executivescompensation (see, e.g. Frydman and Saks, 2010), among
which some predict a positive correlation between rm size and compensation. For example,
Lucas (1978) argues that executivescompensation is related to the span of control; Gabaix
and Landier (2008) claim that the level of compensation increases at the same rate as the
expansion of the rm size.
However, empirical ndings on the relationship between rm size and executivescompen-
sation are mixed. For instant, Gabaix and Landier (2008) suggest that the percent increase
in the compensation of the top executives in the U.S. is approximately four times the percent
increase in the size of the top U.S. rms, between 1980 and 2003. Frydman and Saks (2010) use
long run data for 1936-2005, and nd less strong relationship between rm size and executives
compensation for the period 1946-1975.
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3.3 The Data
The data in this paper mainly come from two sources, both of which are focused on Chinese
listed rms and, to my knowledge, have rarely been used for studies on risk management and
executive wealth. To be more specic, nancial data and corporate governance measures are
primarily obtained from the PACAP-CCER Greater China Database created and maintained
by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacic-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Research Center, covering
2856 Chinese listed rms since 1991. In this paper, I only include nancial institutions1, such
as commercial banks, thrifts and mortgage nance, insurance rms, and capital markets. One
should note that the availabilities of di¤erent variables vary a lot depending on when these
items were required to be disclosed by the listed rms for the rst time. For instant, the
disclosure of total cash compensation of the three top-paid executives (COMP_MG3) has
been mandated since 1998.
I supplement the PACAP-CCER database with the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database to obtain some accounting information omitted by the previous
database, such as net prot and sales. The CSMAR database contains accounting and nancial
information of 2408 Chinese listed rms for 1991-2011.
I match listed rms from the above two database using market IDs (STKID), and after
variable selection, my sample contains 197 listed nancial institutions. All the listed rms
can be identied by unique stock market STKID or company IDs (COID) assigned by the
exchanges, so the matching process is largely straightforward as long as either STKID or COID
or both are contained in the databases. This property gives usage of listed rm data a great
advantage in the aspect of data collecting and provides possibility to enlarge the sample set
to a substantial extent.
My database contains information on prots, sales, total assets, total xed assets, total
cash compensation of the three top-paid executives, total cash compensation paid to managers,
percentage of rm stock held by the managers, type of ultimately controlling group, and so
on. All the accounting items are deated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by
1The classication is according to the GICS (Global Industry Classication Standard) code.
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the State Statistical Bureau. I use average compensation of the top-three paid managers to
approximate the cash compensation of executives. The average percentage of rm stock held
by managers is another crucial measurement. Here, I cannot distinguish between rm options
granted by the rm and shares traded in the stock market. It is possible that personal purchase
contributes to a large part of the stock held by mangers. Hence, I treat stock holding as a
separate income source of executives instead of combining it with cash compensation, which is
di¤erent from what has been widely used for the U.S. data. For the aspect of rm behavior, I
use data for prot, total assets, and total liability to measure rm size and calculate z-score,
an indicator of rms risk level. A statistical summary is presented in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.1 shows the changes in average cash compensation and stock holding of executives
over the period 2001-2010. It shows that the cash compensation has an increasing trend while
the percentage of stock holding uctuates very much. This nding approximates the changes in
compensation structure, and implies that executivesstock ownership might be more sensitive
to the changes in rm characteristics and external environment.
As mentioned above, my database can be potentially extended to the Chinese listed rms
for a larger time span, such as 1998-2012. The disclosure of total cash compensation of
the three top-paid executives (COMP_MG3) has been mandated since 1998. Mandatory
disclosure sources for Annual Reports include the China Securities Journal, the Shanghai
Securities News, the Securities Times, as well as websites of the Shanghai Securities Ex-
change (http://www.sse.com.cn) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (http://www.szse.cn).
The present Shanghai Securities Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were founded
at the end of 1990, meaning modern listed rms have been documented since 1991. Online
sources provide Annual Reports dated as early as 2001, while more historical records could
be found from the archives of major disclosure sources. Also, it is straightforward to add new
data when they are published by matching rms using stock IDs.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Variable Measurement
Measuring Risk
As discussed in Section II, the literature provides a bunch of measurements of rm risk, either
from the accounting aspect (for example, Z-score, the standard deviation of ROA) or the
market aspect (for example, the standard deviation of weekly stock return). In this paper, I
use an accounting based measurement, Z-score, to indicate rms risk level2. To be specic,
Z   score = (ROA+ CAR)
 (ROA)
where the return on assets ROA = Profit=(TotalAsses); the Capital Adequacy Ratio
CAR = (TotalAsset   TotalLiability)=(TotalAsset); and (ROA) is the standard deviation
of ROA over 2001-2010. Higher Z-score implies more stability, in other words, lower rm risk.
This calculation is in line with the literature.
Measuring ExecutivesWealth
This paper considers two components of executiveswealth, cash income (salary plus bonus)
and their stock holdings. Due to the characteristics of Chinese data, as discussed in Section
III, the above two kinds of properties compose the primary part of executiveswealth. Here, I
do not dene this combination as executivescompensation, which is a more commonly used
concept, because some of the stock holding might be traded in the stock market, instead of
being compensated by the rm. Also, I am not including compensations such as usage of rm
properties, travel grants, and healthcare benets, which are not disclosed in the annual reports
and some are ambiguous to measure in Chinese rms.
Measuring Firm Size
I obtain the primary empirical results by using the total assets (in the logarithmic form) as
the measurement of rm size, which is widely used in the literature on links between rm size
2Analysis using other measurements of rm risk will be included in my other work.
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and rm risk. Other measurements of rm size include total revenue, total market value, and
so on. Here, using total assets to measure rm size has its advantage in the sense that it is
generally considered as a less noisy accounting item among all the indicators, especially for
Chinese rms. For instance, total market value, which is calculated mainly through stock price
and share outstanding, might be less accurate to reect rm size. For the same reason, this
paper uses Z-score, an accounting based measurement to indicate rm risk, instead of using
weekly or monthly stock returns.
3.4.2 Regression Specications
Baseline OLS Regression Model
To examine the interaction between executivescompensation, stock holding, and rmsrisk
level, I consider a baseline OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression model as follows:
zit = + 1Compit + 2Shareit + "it (3.1)
where zit is the Z-score of rm i in year t; Compit is the average cash compensation of the
three top-paid executives in year t; Shareit is the percentage of rm stock held by executives
in year t; "it is the error term.
I also analyze the following model to control for some observable rm characteristics and
time trend:
zit = +0 Si zeit+1Compit+2Shareit+3Ownershipit+4Indit+5Y eart+ "it (3.2)
where Si zeit is log of total assets of rm i in year t; Ownershipit is a dummy variable
indicating the type of controlling group, for example, state-owned, privately-owned, foreign
capital-owned; Indit and Y eart are the industrial and year dummies, respectively. Estimates
of Equation (3.1) and (3.2) are reported in Table 3.2.
My whole sample contains information for the time period 2001-2010, which covers the
2007-2008 nancial crisis. In order to examine the impacts of the nancial crisis and see
whether and how the executivesbehavior changed during the depression, I divide the sample
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into three parts according to time, that is, 2001-2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2010. Then, I
estimate Equation (3.1) using the subsamples, and compare the results with those obtained
from the whole sample in Table 3.3.
As mentioned above, my sample has a time range that covers the nancial crisis. So,
it is interesting to capture the time trends when checking relationship between executives
wealth, rm risk, and rm size. Therefore, I also estimate Equation (3.1) by year and plot the
coe¢ cients in Figure 3.2.
In order to examine the links between executiveswealth and rm size more precisely, I
adopted the following model used in Frydman and Saks (2010):
ln (Compijt) = 0 + 1 ln
 
Si zet 1

+ 2 ln
 
Si zej

(3.3)
+3

ln (Si zejt 1)  ln
 
Si zet 1
  ln  Si zej+ "ijt
ln (Shareijt) = 0 + 1 ln
 
Si zet 1

+ 2 ln
 
Si zej

(3.4)
+3

ln (Si zejt 1)  ln
 
Si zet 1
  ln  Si zej+ "ijt
where Si zejt 1 is rm js size in year t   1; Si zet 1 is the average size across all rms
in year t   1; Si zej is the average size of rm j across all years, i.e. 2001-2010. Results for
Equation (3) and (4) are presented in Table 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
Semi-Parametric Regression Model
Now I analyze above relationships more directly, and look at each element by the following
equations:
zit = + g (Compit) + 1i + 2t + "it (3.5)
zit = + g (Shareit) + 1i + 2t + "it (3.6)
zit = + g (Si zeit) + 1i + 2t + "it (3.7)
where i and t capture rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively. Here, I am interested
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in the function g (). I use the kernel-based semi-parametric regression model proposed by
Robinson (1988) and Speckman (1988) for the above equations. The results are plotted in
Panel A-C in Figure 3.3.
Here, I take Equation (3.5) as an example. I take expectation of each variable conditional
on Compit, and obtain the following form:
E (zitjCompit) = + g (Compit) + 1E (ijCompit) + 2E (tjCompit) (3.8)
Then, it follows that
zit   E (zitjCompit) = 1E (ijCompit) + 2E (tjCompit) + "it (3.9)
from which I can obtain bE (zitjCompit), bE (ijCompit), and bE (tjCompit) by using non-
parametric estimation method, and then estimate 1 and 2 by OLS.
Therefore, g (Compit) can be estimated by Equation (3.5) with c1 and c2. Exactly the
same procedure can be applied to Equation (3.6) and (3.7).
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Results for the OLS Regression Model
Table 3.2 presents the estimates for the baseline OLS regressions (Equation (3.1) and (3.2)).
It suggests a relationship between rms risk-taking behavior and the compensation structure
of its executives. To be specic, higher cash compensation does not necessarily coincide with
higher (or lower) level of risk while higher percentage of stock held by the executives yields more
conservative behavior in rms decision making. Larger rm size is not associated to higher rm
risk necessarily. Adding controls for observable rm characteristics yields consistent results,
but if time trend is considered, the strong correlation between executivesstock holding and
rms risk-taking fades away. Findings without the time dummy is quite new in the sense that
it could imply a tradeo¤ between seeking higher (also riskier) stock return and maintaining
value of assets. Again, since this paper uses data for Chinese listed rms which di¤er from
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those in previous research, capturing di¤erent risk-taking behavior might reect di¤erences
between Chinese executives and those in the U.S. and other western countries. In the studies
using U.S. data, higher equity-based compensation generally relates to a higher risk level of the
rm. One explanation of this nding is that the executives tend to seek higher (also riskier)
stock return when they are also stock holders. However, my results indicate that the executives
might prefer to be more cautious when making decisions, if rm stock is part of their wealth.
To take the time trend into consideration and better demonstrate my nding, I would closely
check the executives response to stock ownership before/during/after the Global Financial
Crisis, which is shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 shows the estimates for the baseline OLS regressions using the whole sample and
three subsamples. Executivescash compensation consistently insignicantly relates to rms
risk level, while the impacts of stock holding change across di¤erent time periods dramatically.
For time periods before and after the Global Financial Crisis, percentage of stock held by the
executives does not signicantly correlate to rms risk level. However, the correlation between
executivesstock holding and rm risk-taking is so statistically signicant during the crisis that
it causes the strong correlation when estimating the model using the whole sample. This nd-
ing, combined with the results in Table 3.2, suggests that: (1) executivescash compensation
is not signicantly correlated to rms risk level, regardless of observable rm characteristics
and time trend; (2) higher percentage of executivesstock holding does not necessarily yields
higher (or lower) rm risk without dramatic economy depression, but the executives stock
ownership signicantly reduces rm risk during the Global Financial Crisis. That is, the rela-
tionship between executivesstock holding and rm risk has changed signicantly over time.
One possible explanation of nding (2) might be that Chinese executives would protect their
wealth when facing economy recession and more uncertainty, which encourages them to make
decisions to "be on the safe side".
Figure 3.2 plots the estimates for Equation (1) by year. That is, it aims at capturing the
changes in coe¢ cients of executivescash compensation/rm stock holding over time. Firstly,
it is noticed that all the coe¢ cients are within the 95% condence intervals denoted by the
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dash lines. From Panel A in Figure 3.2, an N-shaped trend of the coe¢ cient is observed. To be
specic, the correlation between executivescash compensation and rm risk increased until
roughly the year 2003, and then slightly went down; during the 2007-2008 Global Financial
Crisis, this decreasing became more signicant, and later in 2009, the correlation got stronger
again. Panel B in Figure 3.2 shows a quite di¤erent pattern for the coe¢ cient of executives
stock holding. Correlation between executivesstock holding and rm risk uctuates over the
whole period. For the time period 2007-2008, which is one important period to study in this
paper, the correlation decreased with almost reaching its peak at 2007. This suggests that at
the beginning of the nancial crisis, executivesrm stock ownership had greater impacts on
rm risk, and when crisis occurred, this impact became weaker.
Table 3.4 and 3.5 present the relationship between executives cash compensation and
rm size, and executivesstock holding and rm size, respectively. Table 3.4 suggests strong
correlation between rm size and executivescash compensation. To be specic, it shows that
the average size across all the rms in the previous year, one rms average size across all the
years, and the uctuation of rm size in the previous year all have signicant impacts on the
determining of executivescash compensation. This result is robust when controlling for rm
xed e¤ects and time trend. Also, the change in compensation is signicantly correlated with
changes in aggregated rm size and the uctuation. However, result presented in Table 3.5
shows no evidence for the correlation between rm size and executivesstock holding. This
result could be explained by the fact that: (1) small Chinese listed rms, especially those high-
technology startup rms might tend to grant rm stock options to align executivesinterests
with shareholders; (2) large rms also use equity-based compensation to motivate executives
and resolve the typical principal-agent problem, and meanwhile executives might be more
likely to purchase rm stock through market trading. As a result, the impact of rm size on
executivesstock ownership is mixed.
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3.5.2 Results for the Semi-Parametric Regression Model
Figure 3.3 reports the results for the kernel-based regression, using the logarithm of the average
cash compensation for the three top-paid executives, the percentage of rm stock held by
executives, and rm size measured by the logarithm of total assets, as independent variable,
respectively. Remind that rm risk is indicated by Z-score, and a higher Z-score means a lower
risk level. Both Panel A and C show frequent uctuations and suggest no signicant increase
(or decrease) in rm risk as executives cash compensation or rm size increases, although
Panel A exhibits a slightly upward line and gure in Panel B is downward to a small degree.
These ndings are consistent with my previous estimates obtained from the OLS models.
That is, rm risk is negatively and statistically insignicantly correlated to executivescash
compensation, and positively and insignicantly correlated to rm size. Panel B clearly shows
that rm risk is reduced when executives hold a larger share of rm stock. In other words, a
larger percentage of stock held by executives is associated with a bigger Z-score. This result
coincides with the OLS estimation for both the whole sample and the subsample for 2007-2008
Global Financial Crisis.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper uses data for 197 Chinese listed nancial rms over 2001-2010 to consider two
major components of executiveswealth, that is, cash compensation (or called non-equity-based
compensation) and rm stock holding, which can be taken as an approximation of executives
total compensation. It discusses the change and determinants of executives compensation
structure, as well as the relationship between executiveswealth, rm size and rms risk level.
The empirical results show that higher cash compensation does not necessarily coincide with
a higher (or lower) level of risk over the period 2001-2010, while a larger percentage of stock
held by the executives yields more conservative behavior in rms decision making during the
2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis. No evidence for the correlation between rm size and rm
risk is found. Furthermore, rm size signicantly a¤ects executivescash compensation, but
not the percentage of rm stock held by executives. Also, during the time period 2001-2010,
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executivesrm stock ownership exhibits more uctuations than executivescash compensation
does.
Results in this paper could shed some light on the risk management of Chinese nancial
institutions. During the depression, stock incentives for executives are strong with respect
to risk-taking. A higher percentage of stock held by executives is signicantly correlated
with a lower risk level of the rm during nancial crisis. However, neither executivescash
compensation nor rm size is proved to be associated with rm risk signicantly. Therefore,
risk control could be better achieved by increasing equity-based compensation. This nding is
di¤erent from what have been widely observed form U.S. nancial rms, which implies positive
correlation between equity-based compensation and rm risk-taking. The unique nding in
this paper might be explained by the characteristics of Chinese nancial institutions and their
executives under a very special cultural background.
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3.7 Appendix
Panel A: Total cash compensation for the three top-paid managers,
2001-2010
Panel B: Percentage of rm stock held by the managers, 2001-2010
Figure 31: Executivescompensation and percentage of rm stock holding,
2001-2010
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Panel A: The coe¢ cients of executivescompensation, 2001-2010
Panel B: Percentage of rm stock held by the executives, 2001-2010
Figure 32: The coe¢ cients of OLS estimate of the executiveswealth and
rm risk, 2001-2010
Note: Dash lines denote the upper and lower 95% condence bands.
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Panel A: The relationship between executivescompensation and
rm risk
The relationship between executivesstock holding and rm risk
Panel C: The relationship between rm size and rm risk
Figure 33: The relationship between executives compensation, executives
stock holding, and rm risk, 2001-2010
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Table 3.1: Statistic summary
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Z-score 15.057 22.784 -13.516 324.826 922
ln(Firm size) 22.15 2.239 16.584 30.231 973
ROA 0.037 0.117 -0.844 0.975 973
 (ROA) 0.373 3.526 0.001 43.874 922
ln(Compensation) 12.522 1.286 3.689 17.673 941
% Share 0.002 0.018 0 0.210 887
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Table 3.2: The correlation between executives wealth, rm size and rm
risk-taking, 2001-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Compensation) 0.715 0.454 0.526 0.526 0.185
(0.572) (0.782) (0.823) (0.823) (0.869)
% Share 88.293* 89.389* 85.163* 85.163* 74.081
(39.866) (39.947) (40.811) (40.811) (40.956)
ln(Firm Size) 0.231 0.405 0.405 0.36
(0.471) (0.536) (0.536) (0.538)
Ownership 0.534 0.534 0.436
(0.848) (0.848) (0.851)
Industry
p p
Year
p
Obs 850 850 816 816 816
0.0082 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.0261
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5%.
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Table 3.3: The correlation between executives wealth, rm size and risk-
taking
2001-2010 2001-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel 1: DV = Z-score
Avg. cash comp. 0.715 0.375 0.157 -0.098
(0.572) (0.683) (1.107) (1.486)
% Share 88.293* -55.682 332.131* 19.299
(39.866) (99.716) (79.367) (69.688)
Panel 2: With rm size
Avg. cash comp. 0.454 1.141 -0.78 -0.762
(0.782) (0.907) (1.736) (1.778)
% Share 89.389* -60.051 338.951* 21.673
(39.947) (99.696) (80.055) (69.86)
Firm size 0.526 -0.713 0.599 0.757
(0.823) (0.556) (0.854) (1.109)
Panel 3: With ownership dummy
Avg. cash comp. 0.526 1.21 -0.907 -0.902
(0.823) (0.911) (1.963) (1.897)
% Share 85.163* -88.089 330.871* 27.739
(40.811) (100.481) (83.290) (72.666)
Firm size 0.405 -0.664 0.919 1.349
(0.536) (0.565) (1.020) (1.432)
Ownership 0.534 1.191 2.421 -4.405
(0.848) (0.648) (2.181) (3.378)
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5%.
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Table 3.4: The correlation between executivescompensation and rm size,
2001-2010
Panel 1: DV=ln (Compijt)
Average Size in Year t-1 0.417**
(0.056)
Average Firm Size 0.379**
(0.016)
Size-Firm Avg.-Year Avg. 0.163**
(0.062)
Panel 2: With Firm Fixed E¤ects
Average Size in Year t-1 0.480**
(0.049)
Size-Year Avg. 0.211**
(0.058)
Panel 3: Including Lagged Size and Firm FE
Average Size in Year t-1 0.598**
(0.119)
Average Size in Year t-2 -0.228
(0.117)
(Size-Year Avg.) in Year t-1 0.374**
(0.100)
(Size-Year Avg.) in Year t-2 -0.272**
(0.100)
Panel 4: Including Quadratic Time Trend and Firm FE
Average Size in Year t-1 0.590**
(0.093)
Size- Year Avg. 0.252**
(0.061)
Panel 5: DV= ln (Compijt)
Average Size in Year t-1 0.502**
(-0.123)
Size-Year Avg. 0.248**
(-0.096)
Note: ** indicates signicance at the 1%.
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Table 3.5: The correlation between executives stock holding and rm size,
2001-2010
Panel 1: DV=%Shareijt
Average Size in Year t-1 0.001
(0.001)
Average Firm Size 0.00003
(0.0003)
Size-Firm Avg.-Year Avg. -0.0002
(0.001)
Panel 2: With Firm Fixed E¤ects
Average Size in Year t-1 0.002*
(0.001)
Size-Year Avg. 0.001
(0.001)
Panel 3: Including Lagged Size and Firm FE
Average Size in Year t-1 0.002
(0.002)
Average Size in Year t-2 0.0005
(0.002)
(Size-Year Avg.) in Year t-1 0.002
(0.001)
(Size-Year Avg.) in Year t-2 -0.0001
(0.001)
Panel 4: Including Quadratic Time Trend and Firm FE
Average Size in Year t-1 0.001
(0.001)
Size- Year Avg. 0.001
(0.001)
Panel 5: DV=%Shareijt
Average Size in Year t-1 0.001
(0.001)
Size-Year Avg. 0.001
(0.001)
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5%.
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